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LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
CLEAR CHANNEL V. COMPETITION ACT OF
2002: IS THERE A CLEAR END IN SIGHT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI) recently introduced a new bill
to amend the Communications Act of 1934, entitled 'the
"Competition in Radio and Concert Industries Act of 2002"
("Competition Act").' The Act is -designed to "increase
programming and content on radio that is locally and
independently produced, to facilitate competition in radio
programming, radio advertising, and concerts, and for other
purposes."'  The Competition Act aims to reverse the negative
1. S. 2691, 107th Cong. (2002), available athttp://thomas.loc.gov.
2. The full text of the Act is as follows: "Competition in Radio and Concert
Industries Act of 2002-Amends the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to revoke any broadcast
station license of construction permit for: (1) willful and repeated unfair or
deceptive acts or practices that significantly hinder or prevent the broadcast of
programming or content produced, promoted, or created by a person
independent of the licensee or permittee; or (2) conviction or final adjudication
of an antitrust unfair trade practice violation regarding concert venues or
promotion.
Directs the FCC to prescribe regulations which address: (1) improperly
influencing the sale of satellite cable programming or content to any other radio
station or unaffiliated concert venue, or of any song, work, or sound recording,
programming, concert performance, or concert promotion to persons not
affiliated with the licensee, permittee, or affiliate thereof; (2) discrimination
against unaffiliated musicians or content providers; and (3) the making of
exclusive contracts with musicians or providers which prevent other licensees or
permittees from obtaining programming or content from such musicians or
providers.
Requires the FCC to: (1) designate for hearing any radio broadcasting
application that would result in the applicant owning, operating or controlling
radio stations having a national audience reach exceeding 60 percent; (20 review
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effects of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act").
Specifically, the Competition Act would direct the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") to (1) heavily scrutinize
future mergers; (2) revoke licenses of radio stations that use tying
arrangements between radio, promotion or concert industries to
discriminate against artists, concert promoters or other radio
stations; (3) investigate "pay-for-play" ("payola") practices; (4)
probe whether soaring concert ticket prices can be attributed to
massive media consolidation; and (5) determine whether the
combined effects of these practices have affected the strength of
diversity, localism and consumer approval in the radio and concert
industries? Although the Competition Act has won support from
record labels, artists, independent radio station owners and
consumers, the Act will face a tough battle against well-
established industry practices, big radio money funneling into the
hands of GOP policy makers and proponents of further
deregulation, including the FCC's chair Michael Powell.4
the use of privately-controlled audience measurement systems for the
determination of local markets of radio stations; (3) modify its rules concerning
attributable interests in radio stations and limitations on local marketing
agreements; and (4) prohibit the licensee of any radio station from using its
control over broadcasting matter to extract money or other valuable
consideration from a record company, artist, concert promoter, or related entity.
S. 2691, 107th Cong. (2002).
3. Bill Holland, Feingold Introduces Competition Bill. BILLBOARD, July 6,
2002, at 9 [hereinafter Holland, Feingold Introduces Competition Bill].
4. Id.; Feingold states, "I hear about these problems everywhere I go. People
are very concerned." Other supporters include: "Jenny Toomey, indie recording
artist and executive director of the Future of Music Coalition; Greg Hessinger,
executive director of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists;
Jim Winslow, executive director of the National Association of Black Owned
Broadcasters; and Gene Kimmelman, executive director of Consumers Union.
The National Association of Recording Arts and Sciences, the Recording Artists
Coalition, and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) also
support the measure. Future of Music Coalition, FMC Joins Broad Artist
Coalition in Letter to FCC and Congress on Current Issues in Radio, (May 24,
2002); In a joint statement to Congress and the FCC, the following groups
support reform in current payola practices and investigation into the impact of
radio consolidation: the American Federation of Musicians, American
[Vol. XII:387
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This paper will include a background section illustrating the
legislative history leading up to the Telecom Act. The background
section will demonstrate the effects of the Telecom Act within the
communications industry, specifically addressing payola and the
FCC's response to those effects. This paper will specifically
highlight Clear Channel Communications and Clear Channel
Entertainment ("Clear Channel"), which as a result of the Telecom
Act's relaxation of ownership limits, has in just six years become
the most dominant radio and concert conglomerate in the world.
The analysis section will address how the Competition Act aims to
rectify the alleged problems in both the radio and concert
industries. Finally, in support of the Competition Act, the impact
statement will address the current state of radio and concert
industries; in particular, how public policy goals such as diversity
and localism, have all but disappeared in the minds of legislators
and big conglomerates such as Clear Channel. In effect, these
industries eagerly submit to the whims of those who have money,
irregardless of whether quality programming dwindles to more and
more homogenous, cookie-cutter rock and pop. Additionally, this
section will address the Act's likelihood of passage, weighing both
Clear Channel's political ties to Washington and the FCC's
chairman, Michael Powell's, pro-deregulatory outlook. Efforts in
support of the Competition Act are notable, yet without
overwhelming legislative support, artists willing to stand in
opposition to huge radio conglomerates and lobbying money,
stations will continue to spoon-feed listeners the same money-
driven songs over and over again.
II. BACKGROUND
The purpose of this section is to explore the legislative history,
Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Association for Independent Music,
Future of Music Coalition, Just Plain Folks, Nashville Songwriters Association
International, National Association of Recording Merchandisers, National
Federation of Community Broadcasters, Recording Academy, Recording
Industry Association of America, at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/news/radioissuesstatement.cfm.
2002] 389
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including the FCC's role in gradual radio deregulation, the
enactment of the Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications
Act") and its evolution up to the Telecom Act. The legislative
history reveals that public policy goals of the Communications Act
are neither expressly written within the Communications Act, nor
are they goals currently practiced within the music industry. An
emphasis on Clear Channel's history and evolution to become the
most dominant media powerhouse illustrates both the positive and
negative effects of the Telecom Act, but more importantly, how
public policy considerations effectively vanished in the midst of
massive consolidation.
A. Evolution of FCC Regulation
As a public asset, radio is a distinct medium that historically
exists to serve the public interest.5 The 1927 Radio Act "provided
structure and oversight to the public spectrum, [but] it failed to
clearly define the "public interest," and generated serious debate."6
Although legislators required broadcasters to deliver diverse
programming and information beneficial to the American public,
the failure of clearly defining "public interest" ultimately left the
FCC with full discretion in determining public policy goals.7 The
1934 Communications Act revised the 1927 Radio Act, yet still
purported two characteristics important to radio broadcasting:
localism and program diversity.8 Since 1934, the FCC has
regulated radio, and from its first approval of radio multi-
ownership in 1938, the FCC's decisions ultimately side with
public policy considerations.' Approval often hinged on
traditional antitrust concerns such as entry barriers, program
5. FMC Joins Broad Artist Coalition, supra note 4.
6. Peter DiCola and Kristin Thompson, Radio Deregulation: Has it Served
Citizens and Musicians? (Nov. 18, 2002), at
http://www.futureofinusic.com/research/radiostudy.cfin.
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing Benjamin Bates and Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis for
Radio Deregulation, 12:1 J. MEDIA OF ECON. 22 (1999)).
9. DiCola and Thompson, supra note 6.
390 [Vol. XII:387
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diversity and censure, independent station owners and undue
economic power, particularly in terms of advertising revenue.
This brief examination of the FCC's ownership decisions
illustrates not only a consistent application of public policy goals,
but also a gradual relaxation in ownership rules and regulations.
In 1938, the FCC first limited radio ownership when it denied an'
application for a new AM station on the basis that the applicant
already owned another AM station in the local market.' ° The
Commission found that a "commonly owned, same service station
would not compete with each other and that granting the
application could preclude a competitive station from entering the
market."" In the early 1940's, the FCC revisited the question and
continued to deny application for multiple ownership in a "primary
service area," except "where the public interest would be served by
multiple ownership."'" In the 1960's, the FCC changed its case-
by-case analysis with a blanket prohibition rule that prevented
multiple ownership if the radio stations' signals overlapped.'3 The
stated purpose of multiple ownership rules was "to promote
maximum diversification of program and service viewpoints and
to prevent undue concentration of economic power contrary to the
public interest."' 4
Local ownership rules are based on two principles: first, that "it
is more reasonable to assume that stations owned by different
people will compete with each other, for the same audience and
advertisers, than station sunder the control of a single person or
group;' 5 and second, that "the greater the diversity of ownership
in a particular area, the less chance there is that a single person or
10. Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.C.C. 183 (1938).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 16 F.C.C.R. 19861, F.C.C. Comm'n Order No. 01-329, available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/Notices/2001/fcc01329.txt
[hereinafter Multiple Ownership Rules]. (See Amendment of Sections 73.35,
73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership
of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order.)
14. Id. at 1476-77 ( 2).
15. Id. at 1477 ( 3).
2002]
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group can have an inordinate effect, in a political, editorial, or
similar programming sense on public opinion at the regional
level."' 6 In the early 1970's, the FCC prohibited local ownership
even further in order to maximize the number of independent
owners of broadcast media. The Commission found that common
owners could "use practices [such as special discounts] which
exploit [their] advantage over the single station owner. '1 7 Later,
however, the Commission allowed ownership of an AM-FM
combination.
During the 1980's, the FCC began a trend of relaxing ownership
rules.' The Commission rationalized that multiple ownership
would not contradict the principles of diversity and competition
because the number of media outlets have increased since 1964,
and that common ownership would encourage efficiencies which
would generate programming benefits. Furthermore, the
Commission "determined that ownership diversity was not an end
in itself, but a means of 'promoting diversity of program sources
and viewpoints.""' 9
In 1992, the Commission reaffirmed its analysis and "declared
that increases in the number and types of media outlets warranted
further relaxation of the rule. 2 °  In fact, the FCC found that
16. Id.; See AP v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating that the First
Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public"). Local ownership limits has been continually supported, and
particularly was reaffirmed in Associated Press v. Untied States.
17. Id. at 313 ( 25).
18. Dicola and Thompson, supra note 6. ("[the] FCC gradually raised the
ceiling on the number of stations a particular owner could control nationwide;
from 7 AM and 7 FM in 1953, to 12 AM and 12 FM in 1984, to 18 AM and 18
FM in 1992, to 20 AM and 20 FM in 1994. At the local level, owners remained
restricted to one station per band. Local caps were raised from one station to
two stations per band in 1992").
19. Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 13, at 1724 ( 7).
20. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd
2755, 2773-74 ( 35) (1992), available at http://www.fcc.gov. The FCC cited
to an increase in radio and television stations, particularly cable radio networks,
when it decided that ownership rules would not harm diversity or competition.
[Vol. XII:387
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limiting ownership actually hurt diversity, opposite of what had
been believed for the previous 50 plus years. 21 The FCC then
determined the maximum number of radio stations a single entity
could own based on four tiers of radio markets. For example, in
the first tier, markets having 40 or more radio stations, a single
entity could own 3 AM and 3 FM stations, not exceeding 25% of
an audience share. 2 The FCC acknowledged that this limit was
"substantially more restrictive than ordinary antitrust concerns
would mandate." Therefore, the threshold standards for evaluating
antitrust claims are more stringent in the radio industry than in
other industries. This line of reasoning further supports the FCC's
dual interest in ownership rules-economic concentration
considerations and protecting and promoting a diversity of
voices. 3
Although the FCC has always purported these public policy
interests, the Telecom Act received criticism for abandoning long-
held policy goals. Even today, legislators continue to debate over
the definition of "public interest. '24 The Telecom Act, evidenced
by Clear Channel, will show that deregulation has ultimately
21. Id. at 2774 ( 37) ("The Commission found that the inability of radio
stations to realize the efficiencies arising form common ownership harmed
diversity and competition by making it more difficult for radio stations to
compete and to provide valuable programming services").
22. Id. at 2776 ( 40). On reconsideration, the Commission modified the
local ownership rules to allow only 2 AM and 2 FM stations in markets with 15
or more radio stations. "Evidence that grant of any application will result in a
combined audience share exceeding 25% will be considered prima facie
inconsistent with public interest."; See id. at 2783 ( 56). Further more, the
Commission will order divestiture of any station if that station reaches or
exceeds 40% local market share.
23. Id. at 2780 ( 50). These concerns are distinct from antitrust objectives.
24. Dicola and Thompson, supra note 6. ("It [public interest] has been the
notorious fudge factor in the FCC's rule making over the years," notes Patricia
Aufderheide. "Failure to serve the public interest has been a stick with which to
beat recalcitrant operators; it has been a modesty curtain behind which entire
changes of regulatory ideology have taken place; it has been the favorite
invocation of every stakeholder in the regulatory process").
PATRICIA AuFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
13 (Guilford Press) (2001).
2002] 393
7
Greene: Clear Channel v. Competition Act of 2002: Is There A Clear End in
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J ART. & ENT. LAW
harmed the public interest.The next section will detail the Telecom
Act and illustrate how its enactment allowed further relaxation of
ownership rules that effectuated a massive consolidation and
alleged decline in diversity, independent radio ownership, an
increase in payola and discrimination against artists.
B. The Telecom Act's Impact on Current Radio and Concert
Industries
The Telecom Act provided for "pro-competitive, de-regulatory
national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private
sector deployment of advance telecommunications and
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening
all telecommunications markets to competition, and for other
purposes."25  In addition, revisions specifically addressing
broadcast ownership rules seek "diversity in programming and
diversity in the viewpoints expressed."26 In 1995, the Telecom Act
attracted significant attention for the telephone and cable
industries, specifically for allowing Baby Bell phone companies to
compete in long-distance business and deregulating cable rates. 7
Two hundred pages of legislation described the Act, yet lifting
radio ownership limits found its place on the bottom of the priority
list, receiving little if any attention." Furthermore, the FCC
typically seeks input and holds public hearings concerning further
deregulation, the Act was enacted without FCC input. 9 Although
radio industry insiders eagerly waited for the enactment, few, if
25. 104 CONG. REC. S652 (1996).
26. Dicola and Thompson, supra note 6. (quoting FCC Chairman Reed
Hundt, Speech entitled, "The Hard Road Ahead," (Dec. 26, 1996), in PATRICIA
AUFDERHEIDE'S, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 289
(Guilford Press) (1999)).
27. Eric Boehlert, One Big Happy Channel?, Salon.com, (June 28, 2001), at
http://dir.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/06/28/telecom-dereg/index.html?pn=l
[hereinafter Boehlert, Happy Channel].
28. Id. Apparently, President Clinton never mentioned during his 'extensive
remarks' that the Act would effectively lift all ownership limits for radio station
broadcasters nationwide. Id.
29. Id.
[Vol. XII:387
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any, recognized the impact the Telecom Act would have on the
radio and concert industries.30
The Telecom Act was praised as revolutionary since the
bipartisan effort attempted to transform the media industry from a
nationwide monopoly to a more diverse and competitive industry.3'
Legislators widely believed that relaxing ownership limits would
increase program diversity.3" However, consolidation allowed
fewer owners to control more and more stations, giving rise to
contentions that the industry was now less diverse and less
competitive. In fact, the Act effectuated over 4,000 of the
country's 11,000 radio stations to change hands in twelve
months.33 Since the Act, over 10,000 radio station transactions
occurred worth approximately $100 billion.34 Although the Act
intended many stations to acquire a couple of hundred stations
each and "cash in on efficiencies of scale," the Act nevertheless
30. Id. One former head of a major radio groups states, "We were watching
the vote come down in a hotel room in '95 and we were high-fiving each other.
We knew the multiple-station deals we'd been working on would come to
fruition." Id. Radio broker Gary Stevens commented that "the irony is that
even though radio deregulation was an 'afterthought' in the Telecom Act, no
other communications industry has been so dramatically affected by the
legislation." Id.
31. Aimee M. Adler, Notes and Comment: Competition in Telephony:
Perception or Reality? Current Barriers to the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 571, 580 (1999).
32. DiCola and Thompson, supra note 6. This theory was based on
economist Peter 0. Steiner's assertion that "multiple stations in a local market
would provide more program diversity in a given market than would five
separate owners." Steiner suggested that "a single station owner would be less
inclined to program to compete for the same batch of listeners." Id. at 8-9.
Therefore, "the local owner would program his stations to appeal to a variety of
different listeners." Id. at 9 (citing Christopher Sterling, Radio and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: An Initial Assessment, IV J. RADIO STUD. 5
(1997)). The Future of Music Coalition's recent study suggests that this
argument, a rational that "put a twist on the definition of diversity," was used to
promote deregulation. Dicola and Thompson, supra note 6, at 9.
33. Jeff Leeds, Clear Channel's Dominance Obscures Promotions Conduit,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2001, § 3, at 1 [hereinafter Leeds, Promotions Conduit].
34. Boehlert, Happy Channel, supra note 27. There are now 1,100 fewer
station owners, down 30 percent since 1996.
2002] 395
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produced only two companies as industry leaders-Clear Channel
and Viacom's Infinity Broadcasting.35 Together these companies
control one-third of all radio advertising revenue, and in some
markets control nearly 90 percent of all advertising dollars.3 6 In
just six years, deregulation has spiraled the radio and concert
industries into such rapid consolidation that Congress now fears
that public policy goals of the Communications Act are at the
mercy of huge radio conglomerates. The Telecom Act not only
relaxed local ownership caps, but it completely eliminated national
radio ownership caps altogether, sending both established and
newly emerging radio stations on a buying frenzy. In effect, 5,133
radio station owners dropped to 3,408, a 33 percent decrease. 7
The effect of the Act, as Feingold notes, triggered a tremendous
wave of consolidations and harmed diverse interests, ranging from
the independent station owners to independent artists and
consumers.
38
Although the Telecom Act amended the Communications Act of
1934, it is often criticized for not embracing the public policy
goals of the original Act. Congress enacted the Communications
Act with the intent to promote diversity and competition in radio
broadcasting. 9 Specifically, Sections 309(a) and 310(b) of the
1934 Act address diversity promotion and competition by limiting
radio multi-ownership as its public policy goals. Unlike the
Communications Act and the history of FCC's policy-based
decision, the Telecom Act does not specifically include or even
address specific public policy considerations. The Telecom Act
directed the FCC to relax local ownership rules. Section
202(b)(1), entitled "Local Radio Diversity-Applicable Caps,"
revised local ownership rules allowing an entity to own up to eight
radio stations in one market.4' Neither the legislative history nor
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Dicola and Thompson, supra note 6.
38. 148 Cong. Rec. S6252 (daily ed. Jun. 27, 2002) (statement of Senator
Feingold).
39. S. 2691, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(9) (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/.
40. Telecommunication Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
396 [Vol. XII:387
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the Telecom Act imports or even addresses the public policy goals
specifically mentioned in Sections 309(a) and 310(b) of the
Communications Act. Although Section 202(h) of the Telecom
Act states that the FCC can "repeal or modify" any ownership
rules that are "no longer in the public interest," the absence of an
explicit public policy section addressing diversity promotion and
competition by limiting radio stations grants the FCC greater
discretion in approving radio ownership acquisitions and mergers
that may be contrary to public interest.
Senator Feingold proposes the Competition Act to prevent
further harm to radio and concert industries. Feingold presented
numerous Congressional findings illustrating the Telecom Act's
negative impact on artists, record labels and consumers alike as
support for the Competition Act. Specifically, Congress found that
since the enactment of the Telecom Act, radio station ownership
has decreased about 25 percent. 41 More problematic, however, is
that the same radio entities are purchasing promotion services and
advertising, and then leveraging into all aspects of radio, concert
(Codified at 47 C.F.R. 73.3555(A)(1) (1996)). "The revised local radio
ownership rule provides:
(A) in a radio market with 45 or more commercial radio stations, a party may
own, operate, or control up to 8 commercial radio stations, not more than 5 of
which are in the same service (AM or FM):
(B) in a radio market with between 30 and 44 (inclusive) commercial radio
stations, a party may own, operate, or control up to 7 commercial radio
stations, not more than 4 of which are in the same service (AM or FM);
(C) in a radio market with between 15 and 29 (inclusive) commercial radio
stations, a party may own, operate, or control up to 6 commercial radio
stations, not more than 4 of which are in the same service (AM or FM); and
(D) in a radio market with 14 or fewer commercial radio stations, a party may
own, operate, or control up to 5 commercial radio stations, not more than 3 of
which are in the same service (AM or FM), except that a party may not own,
operate, or control more than 50 percent of the stations in such market."
41. S. 2691, 107 th Cong. § 2 (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/.
When President Clinton signed the Telecom Act, there were 5,100 owners of
radio stations; that number has now changed to 3,800 owners, a decrease of
about 25 percent.
2002]
11
Greene: Clear Channel v. Competition Act of 2002: Is There A Clear End in
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J ART. & ENT. LAW
promotion, and venues.42 This vertical integration has allowed
radio station owners to have exclusive agreements with concert
venues. In result, "radio station owners have the incentive and the
ability to favor the musical artists and groups they promote."43
Further, Congress also finds that vertical integration of industries
have increased concert ticket prices; in the five-year period
following the Telecom Act, "concert ticket prices have increased
by more than 50 percent more than such prices had increased in
any previous 5 year-period." The Act aims to remedy a decline in
diversity-both in programming and format and also in result of
independent artist's lack of access to radio and increased
syndication and voice-tracking.4"
Massive consolidations have effectively allowed radio station
groups to collect alternative sources of income, often in the form
of independent promoters, play list fees, and concert tour
promotion.46 Congress suggests that the incentives of alternative
sources of income negatively affect programming decisions; these
decisions result in a decline in music diversity.47 One primary
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See generally S. 2691, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002). Between 1991 and 1996,
tickets increased approximately 21 percent, compared to an increase in the
Consumer Price Index of about 15 percent. "From 1996 to 2001, the average
concert ticket price increased by more than 61 percent, while the Consumer
Price Index increased by 13 percent."
45. Besides violating original public policy goals clearly expressed within
the original Communications Act, Congress specifically found that the
concentration of ownership of radio stations and a "reduction of localism" has
exceeded Congress's intentions. Specifically, Congress finds that "top 50 radio
groups owned 8.6 percent of the total number of radio stations. By 2000 they
owned 27.5 percent of the total number of radio stations. Furthermore, the top
50 radio groups accounted for 43.6 percent of the total radio station revenues in
1995. By 2000 that percentage had increased to 62.5 percent." More shocking,
however, is that the top 10 groups "account for almost 50 percent of all radio
station industry revenues, while owning 17.6 percent of all commercial radio
stations." See generally S. 2691, 107'h Cong. § 2 (2002).
46. S. 2691, 107'h Cong. § 2(a)(15) (2002).
47. S. 2691, 1070' Cong. § 2(a)(18) (2002). Congress also notes that the first
amendment embraces the values of diversity on the radio as well as right of
398 [Vol. XII:387
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form of alternative revenue, payola, is a practice inconsistent with
the original Communications Act of 1934 (Sections 317 and
507). 48 Congress urges the FTC to revise outdated payola laws in
order to accommodate musical diversity and legitimate
promotional activities.49
The Competition Act aims not to reverse the Telecom Act, but
revise it in order to (1) rectify negative affects of the Telecom Act
and (2) provide the FCC and courts with functional guidelines to
maintain future competition and diversity in these rapidly
changing and dynamic telecommunication industries. The Act
aims to prohibit any entity that owns "radio stations, concert
promotion services, or venues from leveraging their cross-
ownership in an anti-competitive manner."5 It also calls for the
FCC to highly scrutinize future mergers of large radio station
ownership groups and its effects on independent radio stations,
concert promoters and consumers.5 The legislation also requires
the FCC to modernize the Federal payola prohibition. 2 Feingold
hopes this legislation will restore competition in the radio and
concert industry by allowing independent radio stations and
concert promoters to compete with the big radio conglomerates.53
The Act will "promote competition, local input, and diversity, and
promote consumer choices.54
C. Market Forces Embrace the Telecom Act: The Evolution of
Clear Channel
Competitors, consumers, artists and record labels may cry
people to receive a wide range of information. S. 2691, 107"' Cong. § 2(a)(19)
(2002).
48. S. 2691, 107' Cong. § 2(a)(17) (2002).
49. S. 2691, 107" Cong. § 2(a)(18) (2002).
50. 148 CONG REC. S6252 (daily ed. June 27, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Feingold), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
2002] 399
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"antitrust violation," "discrimination," "payola" and "more
diversity," but despite universal animosity towards Clear Channel,
there is not a single company that does not envy, if not simply
stand in awe, at Clear Channel's accomplishments. Clear Channel
grew from owning one radio station to owning more radio stations,
outdoor advertising displays and producing more concerts than any
other company in the entire world." Although Clear Channel's
success can be attributed to founder L. Lowry Mays, its true
domination resulted from a combination of pure genius and a well
laid-out plan. An outside perspective would assume a
complicated, comprehensive plan to become the largest media
conglomerate; in reality, Mays' plan was simple. Once President
Bill Clinton signed the Telecom Act, Clear Channel bought as
many radio stations in as many markets as possible. Few
recognized the name "Clear Channel" prior to 1996 unless they
lived in San Antonio; today, it is nearly impossible to avoid Clear
Channel, whether one realizes its widespread presence or not.
This section provides a brief history of Clear Channel and its rise
to become the most dominant radio and entertainment
conglomerate in the world.
The dominant empire,5 6 Clear Channel, had relatively humble
beginnings when it purchased its first radio station in 1972." Two
years later, founder L. Lowry Mays purchased San Antonio's
WOAI-AM, making it a news-talk station." Mays slowly added
more properties, cut costs and earned the reputation of "Cheap
Channel."59  Clear Channel's beginnings of major acquisitions
55. Susan Mandel, $23.8 billion merger and still going strong, THE
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 30, 2000, at B1.
56. Michael Roberts, Taking on the Empire, Westword.com, (Aug. 23,
2001), at http://www.westword.com/issues/2001-08-
23/feature2.html/1/index.html [hereinafter Roberts, Taking on the Empire].
57. Id. The companies' chairman L. Lowry Mays purchased KAJA-FM,
along with the assistance of Red McCombs, prior owner of the Denver Nuggets
and deed owners of the Minnesota Vikings football team.
58. Jeff Leeds, Clear Channel. An Empire built on Deregulation, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, § 3, at I [hereinafter Leeds, An Empire].
59. Id.
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began in 1984 when it purchased Broad Street Communications."
Four years later, Clear Channel explored beyond the radio industry
and purchased its first TV station in Mobile, Alabama, creating its
own television branch." Although Clear Channel slowly acquired
stations and ventured into different markets, the last five years are
unprecedented to that of its first twenty-five years. 62 In 1995,
although considered a power-house by industry standards, Clear
Channel had just 16 TV stations and 43 radio stations in 32
markets.63
Then, in 1996 President Clinton enacted the
Telecommunications Act which would forever change the radio
and concert industry, and in particular Clear Channel.
Specifically, the bill increased limits of station ownership in a
single market from four to eight and completely eliminated the
limits on national ownership.' With the golden ticket in hand,
Clear Channel cashed in. It acquired Paxson Communications
Corporation, which owned 43 radio stations, bringing the total of
company owned stations to 173 at the end of 1997.65 The FCC
also approved Clear Channel's acquisition of Jacor
Communications in 1999, which added over 450 stations,66
"making it the largest radio station group in the world. '67 In 2000,
Clear Channel bought AMFM Inc. for $23.5 billion, bringing its
number of stations to 870.68 This merger was considered the
"biggest radio deal in history. ' 69
60. Id. At that point, Clear Channel had properties in Oklahoma City, New
Orleans and New Haven, Connecticut.
61. Id.
62. Id. "The company was a mere mouse compared to its current elephantine
self." See Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
63. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Information regarding Clear Channel's acquisition of Jacor, available at
http://www.premiereradio.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
68. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. Another source reports
that Clear Channel bought AMFM for $23.8 billion. Mandel, supra note 55.
69. Mandel, supra note 55.
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In just six years, Clear Channel "today consists of what were
once 70 separate broadcast companies. 7 ° Clear Channel continued
merging and acquiring, bringing its current number of stations to
more than 1,200 in the United States in addition to a few hundred
more overseas.7 ' Evidence suggests that this number will continue
to rise, even more so if the FCC sides with further deregulation.12
Clear Channel now has 30 times the number of stations Congress
would have previously allowed.73 As evidence of their radio
market power, no competitor owns even one-quarter the number of
Clear Channel stations.74 Further, although Clear Channel reaches
just over 50 percent of the population75 , it is worthy to note that
through Premiere Radio Networks, a subsidiary of Clear Channel,
over 100 syndications reach 180 million people a week. As a
result, Clear Channel radio reaches over 70% of the American
population.76
Clear Channel's aggressiveness did not stop short of the radio
industry. Clear Channel became the most powerful concert
producer and entertainment promoter when it acquired SFX
Entertainment for $4.4 billion in 2000."7 The company more than
doubled its size with this acquisition.78 In August 2000 alone,
Clear Channel had 22 acquisitions.79 In 2000 alone, revenues
70. Boehlert, Happy Channel, supra note 27.
71. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
72. See Clear Channel, at http://www.clearchannel/radio/premiere.bhp (last
visited Nov. 25, 2002). Regarding the internet radio industry, Clear Channel's
"growth strategy is to continue its commitment to internal development, to
expand through acquisitions and to lead network radio into the next
millennium." Id.
73. Dicola and Thompson, supra note 6.
74. Id.
75. Clear Channel, supra note 72.
76. See Clear Channel, supra note 72. This figure is based on an estimate of
11,000 AM-FM radio stations in the United States.
77. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. SFX also went on an
acquisition spree. The Justice Department reviewed 18 separate transactions in
four years. Id. Those acquisitions made SFX a national powerhouse in nearly
every market in the country. See Leeds, Promotions Conduit, supra note 33.
78. Mandel, supra note 55.
79. Id.
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totaled approximately $5 billion. " Clear Channel's unique power
grew to unprecedented force since its radio stations and concert
division worked together to create what executives call
"synergy"-"the ability to use radio stations owned by the
company to relentlessly promote its own concerts."'" Although
some note- that Clear Channel's acquisition of SFX Entertainment
for $4.4 billion was a mark of genius, competitor's immediately
questioned its "synergy," or in other words, its leveraging as a
possible antitrust violation.
Despite earning the number one position in both radio and
concert industries82 , Clear Channel continues to grow in multiple
industries at an unprecedented rate. Whether one realizes it or not,
Clear Channel is everywhere. Its initial entry into the radio
industry has spurred entry and near domination in almost every
area of entertainment, most notably, in radio, concert, sports and
advertising industries. Not only does Clear Channel own over
1200 radio stations reaching over 110 million listeners every week,
their Premier Radio Network syndicates more than 100 programs
to more than 7,800 radio stations, reaching over 180 million
listeners a week.83 According to Clear Channel's statistics, 54% of
all people ages 18-49 in the United States listen to a Clear Channel
radio station on a daily basis.
If not by radio, Clear Channel will find a way to reach you. The
entertainment giant currently owns, operates and/or exclusively
books 135 live entertainment venues, including 41 amphitheaters
80. Id. Clear Channel's size is demonstrated by the number of its employees.
At the end of 2000, Clear Channel had over 29,000 employees.
81. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. Don Howe, Clear
Channel executive stated, "by partnering up with SFX, we're able tot bring to
bear for SFX some very key ingredients of the concert business, which is the
research of that artists will do well here and what records sell well here. Those
are all the things that SFX will benefit from that our competitors will not-and
the benefits flow back to the stations as well." Id.
82. Leeds, Promotions Conduit, supra note 33.
83. See Clear Channel syndications, available at
www.clearchannel.com/Radio/index.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). Such
syndications include Rush Limbaugh, Dr. Laura Schlessinger, Rick Dees, Casey
Kasem, Jim Roberts, Carson Daly and Art Bell. Id.
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in the United States and 30 venues in Europe.84 If owning the
venues were not enough, Clear Channel managed to produce more
than 30 major music tours, including Madonna, Janet Jackson and
"NSYNC.85 In 2001, Clear Channel generated approximately 70
percent of concert ticket revenues in the United States. 6 Clear
Channel is now attempting to cut out the middlemen-the
promoters-by becoming the promoters themselves, evidenced by
recent acquisitions.87 Clear Channel is not just limited to the
United States; it operates in nine European countries and has
begun its march to acquire, well, almost everything it can. Most
recently, an early November 2002 draft of the Communications
Bill confirmed the relaxation of foreign media ownership rules.88
Clear Channel International's CEO Roger Parry said the firm is
selling its smaller British assets to allow for future acquisitions,
including Capital Radio. Sources say the bid for Capital Radio
would cost up to $789.8 million."
Clear Channel produces and markets more entertainment events
than any other company in the world.9 Over 66 million people
attend approximately 26,000 events, which include not only live
concerts, but also Broadway productions9", Broadway shows93,
84. See Clear Channel Entertainment, available at
www.clearchannel.com/Entertainmentlent_music.php (last visited Nov. 25,
2002). In addition, Clear Channel has entertainment venues in 65 countries in
the world. See Clear Channel Outdoor, available at
wwwv.clearchanneloutdoor.com/corp/prDetail.as;?id=20 (last visited Nov. 25,
2002).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Clear Channel acquired top concert promoters in Cleveland (Belkin
Productions), Denver (Chuck Morris Presents) and Phoenix (Evening Star
Productions). Id.
88. See Radio Crow news, available at
http://www.radiocrow.com/newsdocs/radiotv43.htm#111702_1 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2002).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Clear Channel Entertainment, supra note 84.
92. Id. Clear Channel was a producing partner of "The Producers, A New
Mel Brooks Musical," winner of 12 Tony Awards including Best Musical of
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family entertainment shows94 , and sports events.95 In just three
years SFX Sports Group, a division of Clear Channel, has become
a leader in talent management and marketing agency that
represents the world's elite professional athletes in basketball,
baseball, football, hockey, temnis, gold, soccer, figures skating and
the Olympics.96
Clear Channel's Television and Film division produces network
and cable programming on major broadcast97 and cable networks
and also has produced major motion pictures. Another Clear
Channel division is Clear Channel Entertainment-Exhibition in
which it collaborates with Fortune 500 Companies such as Pfizer
Inc., Target Stores, TIME and Hewlett-Packard to bring over 200
exhibits to leading museums and research institutions.98 Clear
2001. Id.
93. Id. Clear Channel's Theatrical Group secured presenting rights to
Disney's "The Lion King" and "Aida" and also the tours of "Mamma Mia" and
"The Producers." Id.
94. Id. Clear Channel partnered with Warner Brothers to produce "Scooby
Doo: Stagefright-Live on Stage." Id.
95. Id. Clear Channel stages over 660 events per year and over 250 hours of
network and cable programming. Id. Such sporting events include Supercross,
USHRA Monster Truck Jam presented by Ford trucks, and IHRA Drag Racing.
Id. Not only does Clear Channel produce these events, it recently acquired the
International Hot Association (IHRA), a premier drag racing series, in 2001. Id.
96. Id. SFX acquired F.A.M.E. in 1998, which at the time, was the world
leader in athlete representation. Id. Some athletes represented include Michael
Jordan, Kobe Bryant, Roger Clemens, Pedro Martinez, Jerry Rice, Andre
Agassi, and Greg Norman. Id. The SFX Sports Group also develops and
produces nationally televised sporting events such as Michael Jordan's Celebrity
Invitational and the American Century Golf Championship. Id. The Sports
Group is comprised of nine offices in the United States and has branches in
Europe and Australia. Id.
97. See Clear Channel Entertainment, supra note 84. Clear Channel has
produces programming on IIBO, CBS, NBC, ESPN, the WB, and A&E and the
History Channel, including shows such as the WB's "Smalville", HBO's
"Arli$$", and the motion picture "Hardball." Id.
98. Information regarding Clear Channel Exhibits is available at
http://www.clearchannel.com/Entertainment/entexbt.php (last visited Nov. 25,
2002). Other Clear Channel exhibits include: "Masters of the Night... The true
Story of Bats," "Extreme Deep: Mission to the Abyss," "Microbes: Invisible
2002]
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Channel's most notable exhibit, "Titanic: The Artifact Exhibit,"
attracted over 11 million worldwide.99
From the time people leave their homes in the morning until
7pm at night, no other company in the world reaches more people
than Clear Channel."'' 0  Clear Channel itself claims that the
company is the "#1 'out of home' media company in the world.
The company owns over 770,000 outdoor advertising displays.'
Not only does Clear Channel own advertising space on bulletins,
airport displays', mass transit displays, convenience store posters
Invaders... Amazing Allies," "Chicano Now: American Expressions," Inside
Africa," and "SPACE: A Global Celebration." Id. More than 80 million people
have attended Clear Channel's exhibits. Id.
99. Clear Channel Entertainment, supra note 84.
100. See Clear Channel Outdoor, available at
http://www.clearchanneloutdoor.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). Clear
Channel reaches approximately 92 percent of the population in the top 25
markets in the country. Id. One example of strategic planning is Clear
Channel's presence in shopping malls. Id. Clear Channel advertises in over 350
shopping malls, specifically in places where 80% of shoppers make purchasing
decisions. Id. See Clear Channel Radio Sales, available at
www.clearchannelradiosales.com/Update/about.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2002). More specifically, Clear Channel claims that "[Clear Channel Outdoor]
is Chicago's #1 choice." Id. One example of local Chicago Clear Channel
advertising is DePaul University's recent campaign to advertise online learning.
Advertisements stating, "DePaul University. Learn At Your Doorstep," were
conveniently placed at mass transit rail sites, including large bulletins in
downtown stations such as Union Station, and smaller advertisements placed at
el stops throughout the city. To demonstrate Clear Channel's revenue power for
its outside advertising space, it is worthy to note that the Union Station "backlit
8-sheet diorama," which reaches over 7 million "upscale, suburban
professionals," that are "92 percent college educated" and where over 52% have
incomes that exceed $75,000, would cost up to $89,600 for four weeks; a 30-
sheet poster, reaching over 93% of the Chicago general population, would cost
$206,640 for four weeks. See Clear Channel's outdoor advertising rates, at
http://ratecard.clearchannel.com/RateCardExtemal/frameset.asp (last visited
Nov. 25, 2002). DePaul's rail station display (full service) would cost up to
$140,585. Id.
101. Leeds, Promotions Conduit, supra note 33.
102. Clear Channel Outdoor, supra note 100. Clear Channel reaches six out
of ten travelers each day.
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and taxi cabs 03, but it also owns over 50 outdoor advertising
spaces in New York's Times Square.' 4 Specifically, through Eller
Media, Clear Channel's outdoor advertising space has been
utilized by McDonald's, the "Message from God" series, and the
advertising campaign publicizing the National Football League's
switch from CBS to Fox Broadcasting.0
5
The Telecom Act effectively gave Clear Channel the green light
to become the most powerful radio and entertainment company in
the world. In terms of revenue, Clear Channel's sales jumped
from $74 million to approximately $8 billion (2001), a 100-fold
increase in less than a decade.0  Its unprecedented growth
naturally received criticism from competitors and industry
insiders. Concert producer Kevin Lyman states, "I don't have
anything against Clear Channel, but the company grew so quickly,
and whenever that happens, you're going to wind up with some
bad eggs in the basket.' 01 7 Yet with further deregulation proposals
looming on Capitol Hill, Congress, artists and consumers fear that
companies like Clear Channel will use their leveraging power to
undermine policy goals first recognized in the Communications
Act of 1934. Already, Clear Channel is continually criticized for
unfair trade practices, skirting radio ownership limits and
monopoly power. The next section will examine how the
Competition Act will affect industry practices and future
consolidation, and in particular, how the Act could potentially
affect Clear Channel.
103. Id. Clear Channel Taxi Media provides "roof mounted, backlit taxi
display advertisements in major United State's taxi markets," including New
York, Los Angeles, Los Vegas, Boston and Miami. Id.
104. See additional information on Clear Channel outdoor, at
http://www.clearchanneloutdoor.com/corp/default.asp (last visited Nov. 25,
2002). Clear Channel Spectacolor creates and operates such video screens as
those seen in Times Square. Id.
105. Id.
106. Leeds, Promotions Conduit, supra note 33.
107. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
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III. ANALYSIS
The purpose of this section is to provide a comprehensive
analysis of how the Competition Act will change both the radio
and concert industries. The Act's language, although somewhat
broad and vague in parts, attempts to protect long-held public
policy goals of the Communications Act of 1934, including
diversity, localism and protection of musical artists. Massive
consolidation and cross-leveraging into the concert, promotion and
venue arenas ran contrary to Congress's original intent.'8
Specifically, one radio station president and general manager
stated:
I wonder if Congress knew when it passed the telecom bill that
people are pigs. Did they realize that half a dozen, all males,
would someday control what goes on the radio, which have no
obligation to satisfy anyone but Wall Street? I don't think they
had any idea what would happen in the radio field."9
Nevertheless, these public policy goals have taken a second seat
to massive consolidation and conglomerate's ability to cross-
leverage into the concert, promotion and venue arenas. This Act
does not intend to reverse the Telecom Act's massive
consolidation effects; rather, its aim is to (1) urge the FCC to
heavily scrutinize further consolidation and (2) reinstate traditional
public policy goals first established in 1934.1" In order to protect
108. Leeds, Promotions Conduit, supra note 33. Andrew Jay Schwartzman,
president of Media Access Project states "Our worst fears have been realized. A
lot of the things Clear Channel is doing are the traditionally questionable
industry practices, now on steroids." Id.
109. Paul Farhi, Texas Firm Crafts Biggest Radio Group in U.S.; Hicks,
Muse to Purchase SFX Broadcasting. THE WASH. POST., Aug. 26, 1997
[hereinafter Farhi, Biggest Radio Group]. Statement made by Geoff Lebhar,
president and general manager of Washington's WWDC-AM and FM.
110. S. 2691, 107 th Cong. § 4 (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last
visited Nov. 25, 2002). Section Four, entitled "Enhanced Scrutiny of Further
Consolidation in Radio," calls for the FCC to conduct hearings for any
application which renews, grants, transfers a license for any commercial radio
station that has an aggregate national audience that exceeds 60 percent.
Specifically, this section calls for the FCC to conduct hearings to determine
408 [Vol. XII:387
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these goals, this analysis will first describe how the Competition
Act directly attacks (a) independent promotion, (b) payola, and (c)
voicetracking and syndication. Secondly, this analysis will
illustrate how cross-leveraging power in the concert industry has
negatively affected artists and ticket prices. Finally, this analysis
will focus on alleged unfair competition claims against Clear
Channel since the company is often criticized for using its power
to exploit these industry practices to gain greater leverage in the
entertainment industry.
Clear Channel holds the number one position in both radio and
concert industries. This section, will focus on Clear Channel,
although not exclusively, to illustrate how its growth gave the
company unprecedented power to utilize the aforementioned
industry practices to its advantages. In addition, some competitors
allege that Clear Channel, in pursuit of further industry power,
uses unfair competition tactics to gain an edge over competitors
and competing industries at the expense of artists, consumers and
diversity on the airwaves.
A. Radio
Massive consolidation gave huge radio conglomerates not only
the power to capitalize off relatively old industry practices such as
independent promotion and payola, but also the power to cash in
on efficiencies of scale through methods such as voicetracking and
syndication. These industry methods continue to influence the
ultimate radio question: who chooses what we hear on radio and
what do we actually hear? The Competition Act alleges that radio
conglomerates that utilize these industry practices negatively affect
the overall content and quality of what we hear. This section will
illustrate hiow the Competition Act specifically aims to either curb
the negative effects or prohibit altogether a) independent
whether a transfer or assignment of a commercial radio station would dominate
the local market. If the transfer or assignment allows the commercial station to
operate or own a) more than 35 percent of the audience share of the local market
or b) more than 35 percent of the radio advertising revenue in the local market
of such radio stations, the transfer or assignment is prohibited.
2002] 409
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promotion and payola and b) voicetracking and syndication. In
addition, this legislation aims to prohibit large conglomerates, such
as Clear Channel, from abusing their power through practices of
unfair competition. Together, these dual purposes attempt to
restore competition, diversity, localism and artist access to the
airwaves.
1. Independent Promotion and Payola
Although the Competition Act is vague and ambiguous in parts,
its language indicates a desire to curb the negative effects of
independent promotion, sometimes referred to as "indie
promotion." With a finite amount of airtime on radio stations, in
addition to fewer and fewer hands controlling scarce radio outlets,
record companies realize that access to the nation's airwaves are
highly dependent on payment, whether it be in the form of money,
concert tickets or prize packages."' Further, radio conglomerates
and individual station owners are desperate to compensate for
losses attributed to expensive consolidation processes and debt."'
111. Lauren J. Katunich, Time to quit paying the payola Piper: Why music
industry abuse demands a complete system overhaul. 22 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 643, 654 (2002) (citing James W. Brock, Antitrust, the "Relevant
Market, " and the Vietnamization of American Merger Policy, 46 ANTITRUST
BULL. 735, 748 (2001) (explaining "sheer size provides these [radio
conglomerates] with what appears to be a growing degree of anticompetitive
power and leverage in dealing with recording companies-a decisive advantage
given the critical importance of air play to the commercial success of recorded
music")); see also Leeds, Middlemen Put Price on Airplay, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
27, 2001 at Cl [hereinafter Leeds, Middlemen] ("Each year, thousands of new
songs are released by record labels, but only 250 or so tunes are added per
station." Also, "the promotion business has gotten even tougher since the mid-
'90's, when President Clinton signed legislation to deregulate the radio industry.
With only a handful of major radio companies left, it is even harder to gain
access and get air time for new music acts").
112. Katunich, supra note 111, at 650. (citing Chuck Philips & Michael A.
Hiltzik, 2 Officials Urge FCC to Probe Possible Payola, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1999, at Cl [hereinafter Philips & Hiltzik, 2 Officials Urge FCC]) (Also citing
Chuck Philips, Clear Channel Fined Just $8,000 by FCC for Payola Violation,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Philips, Clear Channel Fined Just
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Together, these dual forces have created an entire new industry in
order to quickly satisfy the needs of both record labels and radio
conglomerates. Further, independent promotion companies
receive money from record labels, which in turn pay radio stations
directly in exchange for artist airplay."' Today the practice is so
common that most forget that pay-for-play ("payola") is illegal.
Since 1960, federal law amendments of the Communications
Act of 1934 and the FCC require that radio stations receiving any
consideration for broadcasting material must disclose this fact, in
addition to the identity of the person furnishing the
consideration." 4  Specifically, section 508 provides that any
employee receiving money or other valuable consideration for the
broadcast of any programming must also disclose the transaction
to the station."' Although stations and employees that violate
section 508 may be subject to criminal penalties "6, rarely, if ever,
$8,000] (explaining that "huge conglomerates created by the merger wave are
particularly hungry for new revenue to justify their expansions. Merging is an
expensive process that often leaves the surviving company saddled with debt"));
see also Patrick M. Reilly, Radio's New Spin on an Oldie: Pay-for-Play, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 16, 1998, at B1.
113. Katunich, supra note 112 (citing Philips, Clear Channel Fined Just
$8,000); see also Chuck Philips, Radio Exec's Claims of Payola Draw Fire,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at Cl ("Industry mergers have moved the balance of
power to radio groups, which today have the clout to launch a song
simultaneously in scores of markets across the country-or consign it to
oblivion").
114. 47 U.S.C. § 317. One misconception about Payola is that it technically
is not illegal for playing a song for money as long as the payment is disclosed to
the public. Leeds, Middlemen, supra note 111. In all practicality, radio stations
do not want to divulge every single payment filtering its way into the station.
Furthermore, "record companies want listeners to believe stations play their
tunes because the songs are hip, not because they are paid ads, so the companies
go to great lengths to avoid having to use such on-air sponsorship tags." Id.
115. Id. § 508(g).
116. Id. §§ 317, 508. Criminal penalties include up to one year in jail and
fines of up to $10,000. Id. The FCC may enforce monetary damages or choose
not to renew the station's license. See Katunich, supra note 111, at 648, n. 45.
(citing Southeast Fla. Broad., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26581, at 6-7) (upholding
the FCC ruling: "The FCC has discretion to create its own standards for renewal
expectancy as long as it engages in reasoned decision making").
2002]
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are disclosures made." 7 Money, through independent promotion
and payola, rules who and what makes it on the radio. The
original 1960 payola laws have not sufficiently evolved to
accommodate the interests of labels, stations and artists in the
musical landscape prior to the Telecom Act."8 The Competition
Act, through Sections 3'19 and 712°, aims to amend out-dated payola
117. Eric Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, Salon.com (Mar. 14, 2001), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/03/14/payolalindex.html [hereinafter
Boehlert, Pay-for-Play] ("Stations 'are reluctant to pepper their programming
with announcements like, 'The previous Ricky Martin single was paid for by
Sony Records.' Besides that, stations want to maintain the illusion that they sift
through stacks of records and pick out only the best ones for their listeners").
118. Id. (explaining that payola laws are out of date and significantly
irrelevant in the music industry).
119. S. 2691, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
Section 3 is entitled, "Prohibit[ting] the use of radio to reduce public access to
diverse radio and concert programming." The full text includes regulations that
specifically "prohibit a licensee or permittee of a radio station, that has an
attributable interest in a programming entity or concert venue or concert
promotion service from: (A) improperly influencing the decision of the entity or
service, or any musician or other programming or content provider, to sell, or
the price, terms, or conditions of sale of, satellite cable programming or content
or satellite broadcast programming or content to any other radio station or
unaffiliated concert venue or concert promotion service; (B) improperly
influencing the decision of any musician or other programming or content
provider to sell, or the price, terms, or conditions of sale of, any song, work or
sound recording, programming, concert performance, or concert promotion
service to any person or entity not affiliated with (i) the licensee or permittee,
(ii) an affiliate of the licensee or permittee, or (iii) an entity in which the
licensee or permittee has an attributable; (C) discriminating against a musician
or other programming or content provider that does not agree to enter into a
contract or other arrangement with an entity affiliated with the licensee or
permittee, or in which the licensee or permittee has an attributable interest, that
offers concert venue or concert promotion service; (D) requiring an exclusive
contract or other arrangement with a musician or other programming or content
provider that prevents other radio licensees or permittees, concert promotion
entities, or concert venues from obtaining programming or content from the
musician or other programming or content provider to the extent that such a
contract or other arrangement (i) impairs, impedes, or prevents competition in
radio programming or content, concert venues, or concert promotion, (ii)
impairs, impedes, or prevents diversity of programming or content in local radio
26
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laws in order to effectively prohibit illegality from the industry and
thus restore integrity and diversity to the airwaves.
This section will describe the practices of independent
promotion and payola and examine these industry practices effect
on artists and diversity. Specifically, this section will examine
Section 3(e)(3)(D), which addresses the practice of independent
promotion. This regulation prohibits a licensee of a radio station
from requiring an exclusive contract with a musician or
programming or content provider. The ambiguity of
"programming or content providers" most likely refers to
independent promoters. This section prohibits arrangements with
independent promoters that prevent other radio stations or concert
venues from obtaining programming or content. 121 In addition,
this section also prohibits arrangements that impair or prevent
competition in radio programming, impair or prevent local radio
programming diversity or is unduly long in duration."
Independent promotion is most criticized for its illegal practice of
payola. Therefore, this section will also discuss Section 7 of the
Competition Act which prohibits the licensee of any radio station
markets (iii) is unduly long in duration, or (iv) contains unreasonable renewal or
extension provisions." Id.
120. S. 2691, 107 t" Cong. § 7 (2002), available at http:llthomas.loc.gov.
Section 7 is entitled, "Modification of regulations on announcement of payment
for radio broadcast." The full text states, "Not later than one year after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall
modify its regulations under 317 and 507 of the Communications Act of 1934
(47 U.S.C. 317 and 508), in order to prohibit the licensee of any radio station,
including broadcast by such licensee to extract money or any other
consideration, whether directly or indirectly, from a record company, artist,
concert promoter, or other entity or an agent or representative thereof."
Feingold claims that this section "closes a loophole in the FCC regulations
covering payola-to ensure that radio station broadcasts are not improperly
influenced by payment, whether directly or indirectly, to the licensee of any
radio station unless an appropriate sponsorship identification announcement is
made." Senator Feingold's recent press releases, available at
http://feingold.senate.gov/releases/02/06/062702medcon.html (last visited Nov.
25, 2002).
121. See supra, note 120 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
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from using its control "to extract money or any other
consideration, whether directly or indirectly, from a record
company, artists, concert promoter, or other entity or an agent or
representative thereof."'"
(i) The Practice of Independent Promotion and Payola
What ever happened to the days where independent DJ's
happened to come across a local band with the potential, the
originality and the talent to actually make it in the radio
industry?'24 What happened to the days where a listener could
actually call the radio station, talk to the DJ and request a new, but
obscure song by an unknown band? Has the thrill and incentive of
discovering a new act vanished from the minds and responsibilities
of DJ's? The days of creative freedom on air are done.2 5 The role
of the DJ has been reduced to a mere robot. DJ's and
programming directors no longer sort through stacks of CD's to
create a unique, fresh set list. Extensive marketing, TRL 26 visits
123. Id.
124. John Nova Lomax, Streamlining the Hit-Making Process; Clear
Channel wants to cut the indies out of the deal, The Houstonpress.com, (Nov. 8,
2001) at http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2001-11-
08/racket.html/l/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) ("By now, it's common
knowledge that virtually no commercial radio disc jockeys have anything to do
with the songs played on their stations. What few listeners realize is that
program directors, too, are for the most part out of the loop. With radio
deregulation in the 1990s, media has become more and more concentrated, and
what gets on the radio across America is decided by fewer and fewer people,
with more and more cash involved and with less thought than ever given to the
music's merit").
125. Bob Greene, Payola, will anyone even notice?, CHI. TRIB., June 24,
2001, § C, at 2. Payola, however, has been around for at least 40 years. Alan
Freed, the most famous radio disc jockey who coined the phrase "rock and roll"
was accused of accepting money for playing songs on air. Id. After the Freed
scandal, Americans may not think that "a song made it onto the radio because a
disc jockey thought it had a nice beat." Id.
126. MTV's "Total Request Live," counts down the top ten requested videos
of the day. Often, current "hot" artists will appear on TRL to promote their new
video or CD release.
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and continuous, numbing airplay already establish the artist's
popularity and demand. The playlists are already set. Even if a
good DJ today happens to discover the next-big hit, chances are
the new single paid its way into a spot on the coveted playlists of
today's elite radio stations. 27 Although the roles of DJ's and radio
station owners are ambiguous, one certainty is that the role and
appearance of radio has drastically changed since the Telecom
Act.
Essentially all songs on FM commercial radio have indirectly
been paid for by record labels.'28 Millions of dollars each year are
funneled through independent radio promoters, also known as
"indies," who then transfer the money over to radio stations who
add new songs to playlists.'2 9 "Because radio stations are one step
removed from record label money, these payments are not
technically payola."' 30 The biggest gripe about this practice, aside
from its indirect skirting of legality, is that "instead of radio
playing what people want to hear, they're playing music that's
backed by the deepest pockets.''
To demonstrate how the record labels and artists are injured by
payola, a typical indie lobbies a radio station to become their
exclusive promoter. M  This exclusive relationship does not come
cheap. The up-front fee generally costs record labels between
127. Greene, supra note 125. ("That new hit song that the disc jockey in your
town seemed so in love with? Well, in some towns, the reason he was in love
with the song was that he had been slipped cash to love it-or at least to say he
loved it, and to play it").
128. Eric Boehlert, Record companies: Save us from ourselves!, Salon.com,
(Mar. 13, 2002), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/03/13/indie_promotion/index.html?x
[hereinafter Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!].
129. Id.
130. Katunich, supra note 111, at 656 (citing Boehlert, Pay-for-Play, supra
note 118).
131. Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!, supra note 128 (quoting a statement
made by Wendy Day, founder of an artist advocacy organization entitled "Rap
Coalition").
132. Id.
2002]
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$100,000 and $400,000, depending on the size of the market.'33
The independent promoter is "the only person who is allowed to
filter all the stuff that comes in from all the sources and then
present it to the radio station."' 34  For every song added to a
playlist, the indie then sends weekly invoices to record companies
detailing which songs were added and essentially, how much it
will cost the record company for adding that particular song.'35 An
added song could range from $800 to $5,000 in the largest
markets.'36 For record companies to even launch a rock song on
popular stations today, it would cost the company, and indirectly
the artist, over $250,000.' If the song is successful and manages
to reach both rock and Top 40 markets, the indie costs could reach
more than $1 million.'38 The indie promoter, often referred to as
the middleman, "sidestep[s] the federal anti-payola law by paying
broadcasters annual fees they say are not tied to airplay of specific
songs."' 39
The industry continues to point fingers at one another for
creating and perpetuating problems within the independent
promotion industry. For instance, radio conglomerates argue that
stations lose millions of dollars each year due to independent
promotion; if record labels work directly with stations without
using independent promoters, millions of dollars, lost in the form
of salary and bonuses, could be paid instead directly to radio
stations. Pam Taylor, Clear Channel spokeswoman, addressed
payola more specifically and stated that the practice "was created
by the [music] industry; they continue to use [indie promoters].
The day they quit using them is the day the system ends. This is
not a radio industry issue, it's a record company issue.""' °
133. Id.
134. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
135. Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!, supra note 128.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Leeds, Middlemen, supra note 111.
140. Bill Holland, Legislation About Consolidation, Payola Due This Month,
BILLBOARD, June 29, 2002, at 9 [hereinafter Holland, Payola Due This Month];
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Despite Clear Channel's allegation, history proves that the
power to curtail independent promotion is not in the hands of the
record labels. In the early 1980's Warner Communications, Inc.
and CBS became the first to ban the use of independent promoters,
with the expectation that other labels would follow suit. Despite
overwhelming animosity towards the independent promotion
industry, no labels followed Warner-CBS and instead capitalized
on the opportunity to increase independent promotion expenditures
in order to secure greater shares of airplay. 4' After Warner-CBS
enforced their ban on the use of independent promoters, songs
from the Who and Loverboy that originally received an
overwhelming response plummeted off the charts.' Realizing
see also Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56, stating that, Steve Smith,
president and CEO of Clear Channel Entertainment blames the record labels for
perpetuating independent promotion. He first states that "the independent
promotion business is not unique to Clear Channel radio," but then states that
"what Clear Channel has done in the last year is to try to put some restraints and
controls on our relationships with independent promoters-because it is such a
cause celebre." He adds that independent promoters "would be out of business
tomorrow if the record labels wouldn't pay them money. The market power
there is in a record business that's willing to put up the cash." Clear Channel's
throws around its power in a way that seems to at least attempt to counteract the
negative effects of independent promotion. Smith adds, "Clear Channel was
concerned that these independent record promoters were being paid staggering
sums of money, and it wasn't clear where the money was going. So we wanted
to establish very specific rules of engagement. You can't put them out of
business, because the record business is still throwing money at them, right? So
if the record business is still throwing money at them, we're going to establish
the rules." Id.
141. Katunich, supra note 111, at 644. (citing Kerry Segrave, Payola in the
Music Industry: A History, 1880-1991 1 (1994)) ("Music companies themselves
have been ambivalent about payola. They favor a strict ban since that might
prevent new companies from entering the industry. Once payola is banned,
those then in the industry favor violation the ban since it would give them an
advantage over competitors") (citing FREDERICK DANNEN, HIT MEN (Vintage
Books 1991, as stating "as Warner and DBS product go knocked off the air, the
other labels began to dominate the Top 40 airplay as never before. Warner's
sales dropped, and it suffered a decline in the U.S. market share").
142. Id.; DANNEN, supra note 141, at 211 (citing then President of CBS,
Dick Asher stating, "All of a sudden, it just came off the air. It's one thing to
2002]
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that an all-out ban by record labels would be impossible, in
addition to recognizing the independent promoter's power over the
industry, Warner-CBS shortly thereafter resumed the use of
independent promoters. 43 Clear Channel has made attempts to rid
its stations of the independent promotion industry altogether.
144
"Tired of seeing the middleman rake in what they see as rightfully
theirs, Clear Channel wants the major labels to pay the company
directly for playing their songs on its stations."'45 Major record
labels are also trying to rid the practice of indie radio promotion.'
46
If anything, major record labels will receive the most criticism, if
not for directly starting independent promotion, then for
perpetuating payola as an effective marketing tool and financial
incentive. 147
Clear Channel contends that the record companies should be
responsible for eliminating independent promotion. One such
company, Columbia Records, attempted to promote Destiny
Child's new single, "Bootylicious," without the help of
independent promoters. 4 1 In May 2001, Columbia Records
keep something off the air to begin with, it's another thing to take something
that's obviously doing pretty well and just take it off the air. Despite the fact
that stations might have been playing it, the listeners might have been liking it,
they actually could reach back and pull it off').
143. Katunich, supra note 111 (citing DANNEN, supra note 141, at 213-214).
144. Lomax, supra note 124.
145. Id.
146. Ed Christman, Wishful Thinking, BILLBOARD, June 8, 2002, at 1. ("But,
as usual, they [major-labels] are tackling their problem ass-backwards. They are
part of a coalition that has sent a letter to the Federal Communications
Commission to investigate the business practices of Clear Channel and other
radio chains and to study whether payola laws need to be modified").
147. Id. ("First, they [major-labels] invent a shady marketing practice
designed to get them an edge. Then that practice turns around and bites them in
the ass by becoming a very expensive proposition. Then the labels cry "foul"
and blame the practice on whomever or whatever they were trying to subvert.
The majors may not have invented payola, but they certainly managed to
disguise it as a 'legitimate,' if not questionable, marketing tool").
148. Katunich, supra note 111, at 663 (citing Eric Boehlert, The
"Bootylicious" Gambit, Salon.com (June 5, 2001), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/06/05/sonypayola/print.html (last
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decided it would pay the minimum $1,000 to indies that were in
large markets but would refuse to pay indies in "smaller-market
stations."' 49  As a result, two weeks after "Bootylicious" was
released, only 113 pop stations added the single to their playlists;
in contrast, Destiny Child's prior single, "Survivor," was on 150
stations' playlists only a few months earlier.' Insiders suggest
that the nearly forty station drop off was the result of indies
keeping "Bootylicious" off stations where they "maintain
exceptional influence as retaliation against Columbia's move to
limit independent promotion.' 5 1 Both history and recent attempts
to halt independent promotion have failed. Payola laws have not
sufficiently addressed the $300 million problem. Further, if
neither the FCC nor the labels can fight the independent
promotion's power, who will? Although tougher payola laws may
temporarily encourage the industry for finding alternative methods
of deciding what gets on the radio, it is possible that tougher laws
may encourage further illegality and under the table dealing.
Tougher payola laws in the 1980's forced radio executives
and label promoters to find new ways to guarantee airplay. Under-
the-table financial arrangement between middlemen, often referred
to as "quarterbacks", radio executives and label promoters became
the new, yet illegal, industry practice.5 2 Joseph Isgro, a former
national independent promoter, slowed the practice of illegal
independent promotion in the late 1980's when NBC reported that
visited Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Boehlert; Bootylicious]).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Chuck Philips, Radio Exec's Claims of Payola Draw Fire, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2002, § 3, at 1 [hereinafter Philips, Radio Exec's Claims] Chief
Operating Office Mary Catherine Sneed of Radio One Inc., the nation's largest
broadcaster of black music, states, "The way it works now at urban radio is that
[middlemen] give cash under the table to the program director at the station and
then kick back money to the vice president of promotion at the record label. It's
not legal. We can't operate like that. Radio One intends to clean up this mess."
Unlike independent promoters who have exclusive annual contracts to pop and
rock stations, urban music "quarterbacks" are "believed to make direct cash
payments to radio programmers to play specific songs."
2002] 419
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Isgros and a group of powerful independent promoters "were
buying air play by providing radio programmers with cash,
cocaine and prostitutes."'53  The then, "New Payola," was
temporarily suspended when every major record label suspended
the use of independent promoters, effectively driving 200
promoters around the country out of business.
"New Payola," however, seems to have found itself, once again,
in the forefront of scandal and investigation in the music industry.
For instance, Radio One's Chief Operating Officer, Mary
Catherine Sneed, is now attempting to rid Radio One of illegal
practices that not only include under-the-table cash payments, but
"basic old payola stuff: sex, and drugs."'54 Although certain radio
executives criticize the illegal practice, the same executives and
companies, including Clear Channel, are allegedly creating shell
companies effectively allowing the same practice to occur while
appearing legal in its books.'55 Some illegal cash payments at
urban radio stations have been successfully prosecuted. However,
most companies insulate payola practices by requiring independent
promoters to sign contracts that affirm that their practices do not
violate payola laws and are even known to hire former FCC
153. Henry Weinstein, U.S. Indicts 3 on Music 'Payola,' Fraud Charges,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1989, § A, at 1. Isgro was charged with racketeering,
conspiracy to defraud Columbia Records, making undisclosed payola payments
to radio stations, mail fraud, filing false tax returns, conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, and conspiracy to impede the Internal Revenue Service. NBC also
alleged that Isgro was linked to the Mafia. Before Isgro, two of Isgro's former
associates Ralph Tashjian and William Craig, plead guilty to payola-related
charges, including making payments nearing $300,000 to program directors in
the South and West.
154. Philips, Radio Exec's Claims, supra note 152.
155. Id. ("Radio One is trying to use its leverage to get additional money
from the record companies to put to their bottom line. We intend to... ask the
FCC to write new rules because we think the tactics being used by Radio One
and other broadcast groups are outrageous") (quoting Representative John
Conyers (D-MI), "No matter how it is accomplished, payola is illegal. When
radio stations, so-called independent promoters, or their employees demand
money from record companies and recording artists for airplay, the payments
are illegal unless disclosed, no matter how the transactions are structured").
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attorneys to review contracts and station practices.' The
middlemen, or "quarterbacks," are essentially the same as
independent promoters, yet without the same exclusive, annual
contracts and enough room to allow illegal cash flow. 57 "I've
spent my whole life staying away from independent promoters, but
at this point what we are doing is like standard operating procedure
approved by the FCC." '58 Sneed adds:
We've had our attorneys and FCC attorneys look the contracts
over. For us, this is just another revenue stream. We're a big
public company and we owe it to our stockholders. We'd be crazy
not to try to tap into this. Everybody's doing it: Cumulus, Clear
Channel, all the big groups. 59
In trying to rectify the "illegal quarterbacking system," however,
labels criticize stations for intentionally refusing to play new
music. 6° However, insiders allege that these complaints exist only
because someone at the label is no longer getting paid. 6
Although the FCC has conducted investigation of illegal payola,
Sneed suggests that the FCC has never sanctioned the
156. Id. (Richard Robinson, assistant U.S. attorney in Los Angeles states,
"Our office has successfully prosecuted charges involving secret cash payments
made to Latin-music program directors in the past, and we continue to be
interested in investigation any such illegal payments in other music markets as
well.")
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Philips, Radio Exec's Claims, supra note 152. Since Radio One, Inc.
has tried to avoid an illegal quarterbacking system, music executives allege that
Radio One has threatened airplay if labels do not directly pay its new
promotional agent, Ventura Media Group. According to Broadcast Data
Systems, Radio One's play lists at several stations froze after the broadcaster
issues its decree on February 7. Radio One denied the allegations and stated
that it "backed off playing some new music" because of "reorganization of an
in-house research department.".
161. Id. (Sneed states, "We've been having a terrible time trying to get the
record labels to accept the fact that we're finally going to change all this at
urban radio. Somebody at some label is going to get cut out of some secret
transaction when Radio One starts doing things the right way").
2002] 421
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quarterbacking system.162
In the last two years, the Los Angeles Times obtained internal
documents of several independent promoters exposing detailed
logs, called "banks," that essentially list the date a station airs a
single and its corresponding price that the label paid. 63 Not only
does the bank reveal the price labels are paying for each song, the
stations that add more songs throughout the year inevitably earn
the most money and charge the largest fees." At the time the
banks were exposed, in May 2001, insiders expected that the
blatantly revealed practice would act as a smoking gun for
Congress to conduct a full industry investigation. 6 ' One insider
stated that "an appropriate government investigation could blow
this whole industry wide open."' 66 Although this form of payola
seems no different than the old form once outlawed, investigations
have not yet effectuated a change in apparent outdated payola
laws. 167
Although the L.A. Times reported that "an appropriate
government investigation could blow this whole [recording]
industry wide open," Bob Greene, former columnist of the
Chicago Tribune, speculates that payola practices no longer raise
eyebrows as it once did in the past. 68 Radio executives admit to
traditional methods and "new" methods of payola within their own
162. Id.
163. Chuck Philips, Logs Link Payments with Radio Airplay, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Philips, Logs Link Payments] ("The promoter
makes "deposits" when the right songs are played and "withdrawals" for the
station to receive payment in the form of cash, travel and tickets to events").
Essential, therefore, the banks work like a bank account, including deposits and
withdrawals.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Greene, supra note 125 ("Because what at the time of the first payola
scandal was thought to be shocking-the idea that a company would be
expected to pay money to a purportedly neutral exhibitor so that the exhibitor
would let the public know about the company's product-now is assumed to be
the standard way of doing business in the United States").
[Vol. XII:387
36
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol12/iss2/6
CLEAR CHANNEL
companies. Despite massive exposure of illegal payola schemes
throughout the industry, how do labels and radio stations continue
to avoid investigations and subsequent violations? 69 Promotion
companies deny illegality. 70 Promoters also claim that support
from labels have no effect on musical decisions or programming.' 7
Yet some independent promoters privately brag about their ability
to influence programming. One explanation is that former FCC
attorneys draft present contracts between record labels,
independent promoters and radio stations in order to skirt payola
laws. Other insiders contend that inadequate payola laws cannot
overpower the strength of the industry practice. 73 Although the
FCC and DOJ are enforcing payola laws, perhaps the
consequences for violating these laws are too slight to effect an
industry change. For instance, Clear Channel was fined $8,000 for
violating payola laws, however, the fine is a "weak slap on the
wrist from a feeble commission that is no match for Clear Channel
169. Philips, Logs Link Payments, supra note 163. Although the practice has
been "exposed", industry insiders, including Program Direct Dennis Constantine
of KINK-FM in Portland Oregon states, "the document you have in your hand is
typical of the kind of paperwork most independents use for their private
bookkeeping." The Los Angeles times reported that most of the nation's top
promoters do use bank tallies.
170. Id. (citing one promotion company's, Michele Clark Promotion, denial
of illegality, "[W]e aren't doing anything wrong here. The support I get from
labels has no effect whatsoever on the musical decision of the program directors
at my stations.")
171. Id. Program Director Dennis Constantine, of KINK-FM, an Infinity
Broadcasting station in Portland, Oregon, adds, "I don't know hot it got out
[stations and independent promoter's use of a bank-log]. But we don't do
anything illegal or unethical here. No matter what the companies pay [Clark] or
what she writes in that bank, it has absolutely no bearing on how we program
this station.
172. Id. (stating that contracts "specify that independent promoters are free
to pitch specific songs to broadcasters, but the broadcasters are not obligated to
add any song to their play lists. All radio stations need to do in exchange for an
annual fee is give promoters advance notice of which songs they plan to add to
their weekly playlist. The promoters in turn bill the labels for each song that
gets added").
173. Katunich, supra note 111, at 663.
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or any of the other big radio conglomerates that are powerful
players in Washington," said Jeff Cohne, founder of Fairness and
Accuracy in Reporting.
(ii) The Impact of Independent Promotion and Payola on
Artists and Diversity
Record labels must expend enormous amounts of money for
their artists to succeed. Although record labels are financially hurt
by the continuing payola practice, artists are perhaps the most hurt
when thousands and thousands of dollars are required to have
limited exposure.'74 Record labels that spend an exorbitant amount
174. Jeff Leeds, Small Record Labels Say Radio Tunes Them Out, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, §3, at 1 [hereinafter Leeds, Small Record Labels] Jeff
Robinson, owner of Third Monk Records, says of rock singer Matthew Harrison
that "the company can't afford the hidden costs of obtaining radio airplay."
Robinson further suggests that the necessary costs of obtaining independent
promoters effectuate an impermeable barrier to entry. "They've [independent
promoters] got it locked up and there's absolutely no room to do what I'm
trying to do. And if you can't get exposure for your product, you'll never be
able to sell any records." Robinson sent copies of his album to 185 national
radio stations. Without independent promoters on his side, only three stations
elected to play the record, including two stations that refuse to work with
independent promoters and one college station. One program director Robinson
spoke with-Mike Skot, director of KCDU-FM, informed Robinson that
independent promoter, National Music Marketing had an exclusive contract to
work with KCDU and discuss new records with programmers. Robinson stated
that Skot said "'he couldn't do anything because they're under contract' and
cannot deviate from the list of songs allowed by National." In response, Charles
Cohn president of New Wave, which owns KCDU states, "We can talk to as
many advisors as we choose. The agreement that we have with National is
strictly regarding information. We tell them our adds before we tell the general'
public, and that's it. The radio stations play whatever records they want to play.
If this was a very popular local band that created real passion in the Monterey
market, we would seriously look at playing a record like that." Robert Walker,
president of San Francisco-based Heyday Records explains the cost of releasing
a CD: "I can release a CD for $1,000. But the cost of promotion has gone way
up. Even to get airplay on some of the smaller stations, you're talking $1,500
for a six-to eight-week promotion. And we're talking specialty [radio] shows,
which means you get two or three spins a week. For full-blown, heavy-rotation
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of money on marketing and promotion services, through
independent promotion, in turn pass those costs onto the artists
themselves through recoupment provisions in contracts.'75 In
essence, successful artists ultimately "subsidize the payola
system."' 76 Although the artists are most hurt, there are few artists
willing to make a concerted effort to fight the system "because
they fear [that] retaliation' 7 7 could ruin their careers.
Domination in the national market allows stations full discretion
to play or limit a certain artist. Insiders have suggested that this
power is abused from one city to the next; in particular, Clear
Channel has been accused of boycotting certain artists for working
with non-Clear Channel affiliated promoters and radio stations.'
airplay you are talking hundreds of thousands of dollars."
175. Bill Holland, The Dirtiest Word in the Record Business, BILLBOARD,
Oct. 6, 2001, at 90 [hereinafter Holland, Dirtiest Word]; Katunich, supra note
111, at 664. Telephone Interview with Dirk Lance, Bass Player, Incubus (Oct. 6,
2001). Recording artists and representatives contend that "recoupment" is the
dirtiest 10-letter word in the record business. A recoupment provisions requires
artists to compensate record labels for recording and promotional expenses; the
unfair conditions can be so extreme in many cases that unless albums achieve
gold, or more often, platinum level sales, artists will never reap any financial
benefits of their work. Id. Further, Dirk Lance of Incubus stated, "[Record
labels] go and they hire these people [indies] and they never ask the band. So
you get a bill, I saw a bill the other day. I sold three million records but
somehow I didn't make any money because its $500,000 in independent
promotion. Who approved that? We didn't. Yet they want to try to charge it to
us."
176. Lomax, supra note 124; see also Boehlert, Pay-for-Play, supra note
117. Even though singles of successful artists will normally be added to
playlists, artists are still required to pay independent promotion fees. If record
labels do not pay the fees, labels fear that independent promoters will retaliate
and refuse to promote the label's lesser-known artists.
177. BILLBOARD, Feb. 2, 2002, at 96, at http://vww.lexis.com (last visited
Nov. 25, 2002). In prior published reports, Britney Spears was mentioned as an
example of an artist punished by Clear Channel for using another company for
her concert promotion.
178. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. Clear Channel allegedly
withholds airplay from artists who choose to work with outside promoters and
radio stations. Sources "maintain that warnings are plainly stated and out in the
open, with potential clients being told that any misstep will lead to airplay
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Insiders are fully aware of Clear Channel's power and contend that
obvious threats of boycotting artists is unnecessary because the act
is almost expected. '79 For example, Toadies, a Texas band whose
previous appearance was promoted by NIPP, reluctantly signed
with Clear Channel because insiders warned that if they continued
to work with NIPP, they could kiss airplay goodbye.' 0 If a pop or
rock song hopes to have any success, insiders suggest that artists
must have Clear Channel on its side. Although most artists and
label reps carefully answer, if not discretely shy away from,
questions regarding pressure of big radio corporations, Steve
Leeds, Universal senior VP, bluntly stated, "we all know the
implications of pissing off our friends at Clear Channel."' 8'
Unknown artists without money to spend will have a nearly
impossible chance of making it on the radio. Even if independent
labels have access and the money to hire independent promoters,
major labels' financial advantage allows them to "bud up the
promoters' base rates," offer bonuses to stations that add songs,
incentives, [and] concert tickets.'82 In some cases, independent
labels even offer promoters a percentage of album sales revenue.
boycotts not just in one city, but everywhere Clear Channel rules. 'They're like,
'Catch a cold in Denver and you get the flue everywhere else."' On group
suffered a radio ban in Denver for two years following a dispute: "I wound up
with the whole fucking system on my ass. Denver is a prime example of what's
wrong with deregulation. Everything that could go wrong with it has gone
wrong in Denver."
179. Id. ("They do things under the table, with no specifics, since everybody
knows they use their leverage to their benefit. We're talking about 1,200
stations here. Everybody knows if you cross them, you'll get crucified-so why
would they have to tell you that?").
180. Id. Andy Somers, an agent for the Toadies, claimed that "radio is the
key to record flying. We have to have it." Id. Somers called NIPP to apologize
and then signed Clear Channel onto the show.
181. Leila Cobo, Slipping Sales, Media Consolidations, Payola Dominate
Discussion, BILLBOARD, Mar. 20, 2001, at 78.
182. Michael Roberts, Playola, Westword.com, (Oct. 18, 2001), at
http://www.westword.com/issues/2001-10-18/message.html/1/index.html
[hereinafter Roberts, Playola] (Few stations will listen to a song prior to
collecting payment. Since he [the local record producer] can't afford to pay an
independent promoter, he has to kiss hometown airplay goodbye").
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Lebantal adds, "You'd offer anything. Your sister, anything. You
have to give them some kind of reason to [push] this record over a
major-label record."' 83  Dave Lebental, president of small rock
label, Pinch Hit Records, states "the game is stacked against every
little guy. It's not set up for outsiders to come in. It's not a wide-
open marketplace."' 84 Paul Hart, media analyst, adds, "You would
never want to say unknown acts shouldn't have access to the
airwaves. But the reason why they're elevated to major airplay
will strike listeners as peculiar."'85
Representative Jon Conyers (D-MI), contends that radio
conglomeration has essentially barred access to entry of new radio
station hopefuls.'86 In particular, Conyers points out that both
Clear Channel and Infinity control the leading stations in most
markets.'87 In one instance, a Clear Channel producer particularly
liked a local act, however, because of "corporate policy" the
station could not place it on its playlists until it was first brought to
him by an independent promoter.' The independent promotion
firms reported that the cost of considering a song would be a
minimum of $3,000."9 And that amount simply allows the same
producer to hear the same song again-there is no guarantee of
airplay.9 With its prevalent national presence and power, it
makes it virtually impossible for small radio stations to compete
locally at the same level as the national powerhouses.
183. Leeds, Small Record Labels, supra note 174.
184. Id.
185. Leeds, Middlemen, supra note 111. Peter Hart words for Fairness and
Accuracy in Reporting, a media watchdog group. Hart's comment specifically
refers to those artists whose promoters both promote and either own the label or
manage artists.
186. Jon Pareles, The Many Futures of Music, Maybe One of Them Real.
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, § E, at 1 [hereinafter Pareles, Many Futures of
Music]. (quoting Conyers as stating, "The music business is getting more and
more and more concentrated, which makes it in the end, and not so far away,
harder to get into the business and start up").
187. Id.
188. Roberts, Playola, supra note 182.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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If anything, Payola needs to be revamped in order to protect
starving artists. One alternative-country singer-songwriter Mando
Saenz, believes his chances of getting his song on a Clear Channel
station at "pretty slim and none."' 9' He added that from a local's
standpoint, "Why even try when everything's stacked up against
you before you even walk into the office?"'92 Besides denial of
airplay, independent promotion swallows the remainder of limited
salary any artist expects to receive from a CD release.' 3 A recent
antitrust suit against Clear Channel alleges that "[a]rtists or bands
are coerced into signing up with Clear Channel via an assortment
of heavy-handed tactics, including the 'nationwide practice of
threatening to deny and in fact denying critical airplay and other
on-air promotional support."'194
Small independent record labels are devastated by independent
promotion.'95 Small companies are unable to afford the massive
prices for independent promotion companies. ' 6 Some insiders
suggest that independent promotion will eventually cause small
record labels to go extinct. ' 7 As a result, "good," quality music
produced by independent artists with independent record labels
191. Lomax, supra note 124.
192. Id.
193. Id. In order to subsidize the payola system, record labels have instituted
what's described as recoupment, or as Billboard magazine describes as "the
dirtiest word in the record business." The process of recoupment follows: "In
simple terms, record labels will pay for an artist to record an album and promote
it. For these services, labels expect to reap 90 percent of the what profits occur,
if any. They leave 10 percent to the artist, which seems miserly on its own. But
it gets much worse. Out of that tenth, the label expects to recoup its production
and promotion costs. What is left over after that, the artist is welcome to.
Worse still, the-label gets to keep the .recording after its costs have been
recouped, even though by this time the artist has paid for it with the pittance the
label has pretended to give him. What all this amounts to is successful acts
subsidizing the payola system.
194. Katunich, supra note 111, at 667-78 (citing Boehlert, Taking on the
Empire, supra note 56).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. Failure to obtain radio airplay will likely drive smaller record labels
to extinction.
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will be prohibited from radio simply because the music does not
have the requisite financial backing to afford independent
promotion fees.
A combination of dropping CD sales, internet piracy, and indie
promotion, costing over $100 million each year and estimated up
to $300 million by one record company executive'98, has resulted
in record companies calling on the FCC to develop updated,
tougher payola rules for radio.'99 The Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") petitions the FCC to review the
current rules.0 From there the FCC, if it decides the rules need to
change or need clarification, will accept written public comments
from all interested parties, from record companies, to Indies,
artists, and even every day radio listeners."' Commissioners
would evaluate the comments and then make a decision.2 2 In a
similar investigation, the FCC recently released 12 studies on the
current media marketplace, particularly focusing on media
ownership and how it affects diversity, localism and
competition.0 3 One foreseeable problem in petitioning the FCC is
gaining artists' support. Artists are generally adamantly opposed to
the current payola schemes primarily because they sacrifice
revenues by indirectly paying promotion companies or by
providing radio stations with free benefit concerts. Yet most
198. Greg Kot, Music Industry raises its voice for radio reforms, CHI. TRIB.,
May 23, 2002, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/showcase/chi-
0205230238may23.story?coll=chi-n.
199. Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!, supra note 128; see also Eric
Boehlert, Will Congress Tackle Pay-for-Play, Salon.com (June 25, 2002), at
http://salon.com/ent/feature/2002/06/25/pfp congress/index.html [hereinafter
Boehlert, Will Congress Tackle Pay-for-Play]. The Recording Industry
Association of America's Hilary Rosen, president and CEO, states, "We believe
the FCC has the authority to make new rules to more closely regulate practice
and regulate [independent] promoters' relationship with radio stations."
200. Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!, supra note 128.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. For more information on radio ownership see
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
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artists will not sign onto a petition since fighting radio
conglomerates could potentially hurt their career."4 One manager
stated, "You'd have to be nuts to come forward. 20 5
With only a handful of companies deciding what finds its way
on the airwaves, it is only natural to question if independent
promotion limits the diversity of programming and music on radio.
Critics suggest that the "practice of payment for broadcast results
in mediocre radio-with radio stations airing songs not based on
research, sales, and requests, but with airtime going to the highest
bidder. '26 Money could potentially exclude a range and quality of
music and programming appealing to a broader audience than what
we see today. With only a handful of record labels and
independent promotion companies deciding what we hear on the
radio today, a decline in diversity is possible, if not imminent.
Playlists are now controlled by only a few programmers. Clear
Channel, controlling over 1,200 radio stations, had only six
promoters with access to its stations in 2001. Six independent
promotion companies are therefore controlling what millions and
millions of people hear each day. Listeners no longer call in and
request the songs they want to hear. The selection of songs is in a
select few hands. Jenny Toomey, executive director of Future of
Music Coalition states,
When there's only two people who own 70 percent of the
important commercial market radio stations, then they can force
you to pay huge amounts of money. Now, if there were more folks
who owned more stations, and more diversity of stations, then you
could hear more music and you could promote on those stations
204. Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!, supra note 128. (One manager
claims that record labels are to blame. "They [the labels] are the fucking
problem, now you want us to put a target on our backs? Fuck it." If musicians
complain about indie promotion, they fear they will be kept off the radio.
"Without commercial airplay it's virtually impossible to sustain a career").
205. Id.
206. Katunich, supra note 111, at 671 (citing Chuck Taylor, Paid Play
Changing Biz Landscape: Rise of Direct Label/Radio Pacts Sparks Wide-
ranging Debate, BILLBOARD, May 9, 1998, at 1).
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for less.2 °7
Allegations exist that Clear Channel discriminates against non-
Clear Channel promoters and its own artists with threats of airplay.
If a non-Clear Channel promoter wishes to advertise a concert on a
Clear Channel station, promoters may be forced to pay additional
money, giving rise to questions of promotional and artist access. 23
Even if independent promoters buy advertising time on a Clear
Channel station, promoters do not have confidence that concert
advertisements and ticket giveaways will find time on the
airwaves.0 9 Promoting a top 10 single to radio stations alone can
cost record labels millions.210 Clear Channel's new profit-seeking
innovations pressure artists to succumb or risk valuable airplay.
At a three-day Clear Channel company conference, record
companies were charged $35,000 each for the right to have acts
perform in a room fall of Clear Channel's promoters. This
conference alone netted Clear Channel over $1 million.21
The threat of airplay forces artists to be at the mercy of huge
radio conglomerates. Not only do radio stations reap the
benefits of free advertising and higher ratings, but radio stations
have in the past offered money to local charities through forced
207. Lomax, supra note 124.
208. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. An NIPP promoter for
the band Tool who wished to give twenty giveaway tickets to a concert was
informed that "as a non-Clear Channel promoter, want ticket giveaways on the
air, we have to buy," as if it were any other advertisement. Morreale stated,
"We should have access to the same promotional opportunities as any other
client, and that includes a client they own." Clear Channel's Mike O'Connor,
stated that "Our practice form this point forward is that concert promoters
outside of SFX [now Clear Channel] that wish on-air mentions can pay for
them."
209. Id. Although NIPP bought advertising on Denver station KTCL for an
upcoming date of the Warped Tour, neither on-air mentions by disc jockeys or
ticket giveaways were handed out over the air, yet allegedly KTCL employees
received the concert tickets.
210. Pareles, supra note 186.
211. Boehlert, Save us from Ourselves!, supra note 128.
212. Philips & Hiltzik, 2 Officials Urge FCC, supra note 112. (stating that
artist managers contend that dozens of acts are pressured by radio stations to
perform without pay at charity concerts).
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benefit concerts.2 3 Not only do record label companies have to
pay the radio stations for the so-called marketing campaign, but
they must provide benefit concerts, free tickets to shows and give-
away trips, all for the hope that the station plays their song heavily
in rotation.1 4 Simply put, artists must comply with record labels
and stations if they have any hope of success.
In.2001, Clear Channel merged with the Ackerly Group which
boasts "outdoor, TV, radio and interactive assets.21 5 The merger
effectively allowed Clear Channel to [finally] gain access to the
Boston, Seattle and Portland, Oregon markets, three of the top
twenty-five markets in the country. 6 The merger added 6,000
outdoor displays, sixteen television stations as well as
programming at two others, and four radio stations, plus the sales
and other services to one more station. Clear Channel's
presence in Seattle could potentially threaten the city's hub for
independent artists and unknowns waiting to be discovered. One
could argue that Clear Channel's homogenized national playlists
could not only overpower the ingenuity and uniqueness of
Seattle's airwaves, but also serve as a threat to struggling
alternative artists waiting, and depending on Seattle, to break into
the big-time music industry. If struggling independent artists
depend on money and national backing to get their voices heard,
its arguable that Clear Channel could potentially exclude the next
Nirvana, Soundgarden, Alice in Chains, or Pearl Jam, which all
were bands originally formed or discovered in Seattle. 8
213. Id. A Dallas based radio station owned by Chancellor Media charged
A&M records $237,000 for a marketing campaign to promote Bryan Adams'
new single, "On a Day Like Today." Although the campaign included
commercials and contests, Adams was forced to perform for free at four
Chancellor benefit concerts, including Detroit, Orlando, Philadelphia and
Boston.
214. Id.
215. Information regarding Clear Channel's merger with Ackerly available
at http://www.clearchanneloutdoor.com/corp/prDetail.asp?id=20 (last visited
Nov. 25, 2002).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. For more information regarding Seattle bands see
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2. Voicetracking and Syndication
The Competition Act attempts to limit voicetracking and
syndication in order to preserve diversity on the airwaves, and to
ensure that local music and programming has access to the
airwaves in order to satisfy local communities' diverse interests.
Consolidation allowed stations to downsize their operations; in
effect, a number of stations could operate from one building,
"sharing a single advertising staff, technicians and on-air talent. '' 219
Voicetracking is a method in which large radio conglomerates tape
radio shows from one central location and then air the pre-taped
shows on radio stations throughout the country. For example,
Rick Dee's Top 40 Countdown is pre-taped each week and then
broadcasted nationwide on Clear Channel's pop stations.
Syndication is a method where radio conglomerates license live
radio programs and talk-shows throughout the country to a number
of stations, regardless of whether they are owned by the radio
conglomerate or not. For example, Clear Channel syndicates Dr.
Laura Schlessinger's radio show throughout the country to Clear
Channel affiliated and non-affiliated stations. The number of
shows that are either voicetracked or syndicated allegedly not only
limits programming decisions affecting overall programming
diversity, but also ignores local community interests.
The Competition Act, through section six, entitled
"Modification of Attributable Interest in Radio Stations and
Limitations on Local Marketing Agreements," essentially "closes a
loophole in the local marketing agreement regulations to ensure
that any station that receives a significant amount of its play lists
or advertising from another station is considered under the local
ownership cap. '20 This section aims to preserve localism and
http://www.theicebertg.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
219. DiCola and Thompson, supra note 6.
220. The relevant text of Section 6 is as follows:
MODIFICATION OF ATTRIBUTABLE INTEREST- The Federal
Communications Commission shall modify its rules under section 73.3555 of
title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, in order to provide the following:(l) That
a licensee or permittee of a commercial AM or FM radio station shall be treated
4332002]
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diversity by limiting syndication and national programming, as
as having an attributable interest in an entity that supplies more than 15 percent
of the total weekly broadcast programming hours to another licensee or
permittee of a commercial AM or FM radio station if-
(A) the licensee or permittee holds equity (including all stock, whether
voting or nonvoting and whether common or preferred) and debt in such entity
in excess of 33 percent of total asset value of such entity, as determined by
taking into account the aggregate value of all equity and debt of such entity; or
(B) the licensee or permittee holds an option to purchase or acquire such entity.
(2) That a licensee or permittee of a commercial AM or FM radio station shall
be treated as having an attributable interest in another licensee or permittee of a
commercial AM or FM radio station if an individual or entity serving the
licensee or permittee serves such other licensee or permittee in an identical or
similar capacity with regard to the provision of program content, selection of
program content, or supervision of selection of program content for such other
commercial AM or FM radio station.
(b) REPORTS ON SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP CONTRACTS-
(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Commission shall prescribe in regulations requirements that each
licensee or permittee of a radio station submit to the Commission a report on
each special relationship contract between such licensee or permittee and
another licensee or permittee of a radio station, or any person or entity having an
attributional interest in such other licensee or permittee, in the market served by
such licensee or permittee.
(2) SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP CONTRACT DEFINED- In this subsection,
the term 'special relationship contract' means a contract, option, or other
arrangement regarding management, programming, or sales, an actual or
contingent financial arrangement, ownership interest, investment, or loan
between the parties to such contract, option, or other arrangement or their
immediate families.
(c) LIMITATION ON DURATION OF CERTAIN LOCAL MARKETING
AGREEMENTS-
IN GENERAL- No local marketing agreement or other agreement entered into
or renewed after the date of the enactment of this Act under which a licensee or
permittee of a commercial radio station, or any person or entity having an
attributional interest in the commercial radio station, provides more than 15
percent of the programming or content to another commercial radio station in
the same market may have a term exceeding one year, including any period of
renewal of such agreement.
S. 2691, 107'h Cong. § 6 (2002), available at http://www.thomas.loc.gov (last
visited Nov. 25, 2002).
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well as national advertising."' Specifically, the section modifies
what constitutes an "attributable interest," thereby effectuating a
stricter standard for evaluating local radio ownership caps. The
legislation treats a licensee of a commercial AM or FM radio
station as having an attributable interest in an entity that supplies
more than 15 percent of the total weekly broadcast programming
hours to another licensee of a commercial AM or FM radio
station." The licensee also has an attributable interest in another
entity if an individual or entity serves in the same capacity
regarding program content or selection of program content for
another AM or FM radio station.
In practice, if Clear Channel provides more than 15% of total
weekly broadcasting to another station, regardless of whether it is
a Clear Channel affiliate or not, then that station is considered a
"Clear Channel" station. Clear Channel already owns the
maximum amount of stations allowed by the FCC's ownership
limits. If the Competition Act passes, Clear Channel would either
have to limit the use of voicetracking or syndication to under 15%
of the total broadcast programming or completely disaffiliate itself
from that particular station. The Act ensures that radio
conglomerates do not become too powerful by determining all
programming decisions. At a minimum, the Act ensures that
stations at least have the opportunity to tailor its programming to
local interests. Further, limiting voicetracking and syndication,
which typically contains national advertising, will allow local
companies advertising time. This will not only benefit the
consumers within the local community, but also the local
companies thus effecting the financial prosperity of local
communities.
Voicetracking potentially threatens local communities from
hearing news that is pertinent to local interests. Consolidation has
allowed stations to effectively manage news departments. Instead
221. Id.
222. Id. The licensee or permittee holds equity (including all stock, whether
voting or nonvoting and whether common or preferred) and debt in such entity
in excess of 33 percent of total asset value of such entity, as determined by
taking into account the aggregate value of all equity and debt of such entity.
2002] 435
49
Greene: Clear Channel v. Competition Act of 2002: Is There A Clear End in
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J ART & ENT LAW
of operating at a local level, large powerhouses such as Clear
Channel, can operate one or several news departments at the
national level." 3 Although consolidation has its supporters, some
fear that a few elite groups will dominate the news industry and no
longer reflect the "special character of their communities." '224
Andrew Jay Schwartzman, president of Media Access Project, a
Washington-based public interest group, states that "when you
have one of the major sources of local news and information
restructured so that one company controls a substantial proportion
of the editorial voices in a community in that medium, that's not
good for democracy." '25
Although Congress suggests that programming has become
more diverse, insiders suggest that sharing resources between
signals, through mechanisms such as syndicated and voicetracked
programming "undercuts variety, originality and, oftentimes,
station personality."2 6 Furthermore, consumers have criticized the
"increasingly narrow playlists larded with ever more predictable
223. Steve Knoll, Radio Station Consolidation: Good News for Owners, but
What About Listeners?, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 30, 1996) § D, at 5.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. For example, a "stand-
up comic will sometimes appear on four different Clear Channel stations over
the span of an hour or two, as might the same staff or reporters," which is one of
the reasons why industry insiders have terms Clear Channel as "Cheap
Channel."; see also Todd Spencer, Radio killed the radio star,- Consolidation
has resulted in 10,000 layoffs, the demise of a beloved trade magazine, and a
decline in programming quality. But industry execs are fat and happy,
Salon.com, (Oct. 1, 2002), at
http://www.archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/l0/01/nab/ (last visited Nov.
25, 2002). Former managing editor of Gavin Magazine, Todd Spencer, states,
"I was angry, but not just about being laid off. The consolidation of the radio
business in the hands of a very few, powerful corporate owners has devastated
the quality of commercial radio. Every year, radio programming is produced
with smaller and smaller budgets by fewer and fewer people with more and
more smoke and mirrors: cookie-cutter music formats, overuse of syndication,
tighter, more repetitive playlists filled with inferior songs, one programming
staff operating a cluster of stations and commercial breaks that never seem to
end."
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material,"'  despite the FTC's findings of improved diversity of
programming. Although Clear Channel's Don Howe stated that
"we get a lot of benefits from having eight stations. I think the
programming is more diverse and the research is stronger. That's
been the result of conglomeration." 22 Further, on the other hand,
the Future of Music Coalition, a Washington think tank, recently
conducted a poll revealing that 68% of radio listeners want "the
government to consider laws ensuring that all musical artists have
a 'more reasonable chance' of getting their songs heard." 9
Sources say that voicetracking has been a product of Clear
Channel's increasing debt.2 11 Clear Channel has utilized this cost-
227. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
228. Id.
229. Information regarding the Future of Music Coalition suvey, available at
http://www.futureofinusic.org/news/Prradiosurvey.cfin (last visited Nov. 25,
2002). The telephone survey, conducted from May 13-20, 2002 asked 500
randomly selected adults throughout the United States a variety of questions
about radio. The results are as follows: 1) "Consolidation of radio station
ownership is not popular. Eight of ten favor congressional action to protect or
expand the number of independently owned local stations; 2) By a better than
ten to one ratio-76 percent to 7 percent-radio listeners believe that DJs
should be given more air time for songs they think will be of interest to their
audiences rather than be required to mostly play songs of artists backed by
recording companies; 3) If it can be substantiated that radio stations are paid to
give air time preference to the music artists supported by record companies, the
public approves by a 68 to 24 percent ration for Congress to consider passing
laws to ensure that all artists have a more reasonable chance of having their
songs heard; 4)Half of the respondents-52 percent-say radio would be more
appealing to them if it offered more new music, less repetition and more music
of local bands and artists; 5) By a ratio of six to one, radio listeners prefer a
long, rather than a short, playlist that provides them a greater variety of songs
and less repetition during the week; 6) Seventy-five percent would like to see
low power FM stations (LPFM) expanded in their communities, especially if
they offer (a) the music of local bands and artists, (b) talk shows on issues of
local interest, and on local issues and (c) health, science or fitness programming.
Additionally, 74 percent favor legislation to expand the number of LPFM
stations in the United States.
230. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58. Clear Channel currently operates
under a $9 billion debt. On February 22, the company's stock closed Friday at
$48.39, about half its record high two years ago.
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cutting strategy by "repackaging" radio shows across the country.
In 48 cities, listeners listen to Kiss FM. The deejays are located in
Los Angeles, working for Clear Channel's top pop station KIIS-
FM. Instead of live deejays talking about local news of
Jacksonville, FL or Des Moine, Iowa, Clear Channel tapes
segments, including play lists, upcoming concerts and phone calls,
and airs these prior recordings throughout the country."' This
digital network of voicetracking is available to 80% of Clear
Channel stations.232 Although Clear Channel argues that this
strategy allows smaller markets to capitalize on "big city deejay
talent," its apparent that cutting and pasting segments to create the
appearance of deejays taking live request and calls from
listeners 3 , decreases the overall diversity in programming on a
nation-wide level. Clear Channel admits that the Kiss brand is like
McDonald's, but defends the cookie-cutter operation in that Kiss
stations are "all localized inside." 4 In essence, Clear Channel is a
factory for radio.3 Mike Spencer, programmer at rival pop station
KLUC-FM in Las Vegas, stated "They're making radio into
spoon-fed generic junk." "l6 Since Clear Channel not only owns
radio stations, but also syndicated radio shows, it has been known
to use its power by taking its syndicated shows of competitors'
radio stations on place them instead on Clear Channel stations. 37
Although syndication has opponents, Clear Channel contends
that syndication allows radio to reach a greater number of people,
therefore satisfying consumer's desire for sufficient, diverse radio
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. (quoting Todd Shannon, a Clear Channel brand manager, "[O]ur
Kiss brand is like McDonald's. When you see the Kiss ball logo, there's no
mistaking what you're going to get. It's a Top 40 product, but they're all
localized inside").
235. Id. In Chicago, Clear Channel acquired an oldies stations and converted
it into a Kiss outlet that features local deejays only during the afternoon and
evening shifts. Todd Cavanah, program director at competing pop station
WBBM-FM stated, "Everything else is the robot."
236. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58.
237. Id.
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programming. In addition, Clear Channel recently attributes one
of their syndicated shows, "The Trucking Bozo," for having a
direct hand in soling the recent sniper killings in the Washington,
D.C.-Maryland-Virginia area. 8 Tracker Ron Lantz of Kentucky
was listening to 700WLW's Dale Sommers, host of the show,
describe the vehicles police were looking for in connection with
the shootings. 39 Lantz spotted the suspect's car parked in a
Maryland rest area and called police who later apprehended the
suspects.24 Lantz "even used his own rig to block a potential
escape route out of the rest area." '41 Clear Channel's CEO, L.
Lowry Mays, stated, "We're proud for Clear Channel to have
played a part in ending this terrible episode. We've always
focused this company on serving our communities, and I can think
of no higher service than what Dale Sommers and Ron Lantz did
to help the authorities in this case."'242 Mays also suggested "the
apprehension of the suspects underscores the power of radio to
support the public interest."243  Syndication may potentially
threaten diversity on air, however, as Clear Channel promotes,
there are advantages of syndicating shows throughout the country.
Voicetracking and syndication strips away responsibilities of
Dl's and program directors, moreover, these methods explain the
decrease in the number of people employed in the radio industry.2'
One radio veteran estimates that the Telecom Act eliminated
nearly 10,000 radio-related jobs. "It's been fabulous for
shareholders, but terrible for listeners and employees," says a
former broadcast group chief, "[I] wanted to see radio
deregulation. But I think Telecom has done a disservice to what
238. Clear Channel's recent press release regarding the sniper case is
available at
www.clearchannel.com/documents/press-releases/20021029_CorpTbozo.pdf
(last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Clear Channel's press releases, supra note 238.
244. DiCola and Thompson, supra note 6, at 13.
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was once a great business." 4 ' Voicetracking has not only harmed
diversity and employment, but it also harmed radio conglomerates.
Florida's attorney general fined Clear Channel for $80,000 for
misleading listeners into thinking that a national contest was
local. 46 Clear Channel dubbed a local deejay's voice during an
interview with the contest winner. 4 7 Enacting the Competition
Act could potentially curb the negative effects associated with
syndication and voicetracking.
B. Concert
This section will specifically focus on effects of the Competition
Act on the concert industry. Section 3 of the Competition Act
addresses unfair competition practices, particularly when a radio
station entity "uses its cross-ownership of promotion services or
venues to discriminate against musicians concert promoters, or
other radio stations."248 Further, this section also gives the FCC
245. Boehlert, Happy Channel, supra note 27.
246. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58.
247. Id.
248. The relevant text of Section 3 is as follows: PROHIBITION ON USE
OF RADIO TO REDUCE PUBLIC ACCESS TO DIVERSE RADIO AND
CONCERT PROGRAMMING AND CONTENT.
(a) REVOCATION OF LICENSE FOR HINDERING AVAILABILITY OF
INDEPENDENT, LOCAL PROGRAMMING AND CONTENT- Section
312(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 312(a)) is amended-
'(8) for willful and repeated engagement in unfair methods of competition,
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, or tying the use of entities owned by the
licensee or permittee for the purpose of hindering significantly, or preventing,
the broadcast of programming or content, including any sound recording by a
musical artist, if such programming or content is produced or promoted by a
person independent of the licensee or permittee or the creator thereof is
independent of the licensee or permittee; or,
(b) REVOCATION OF LICENSE FOR HINDERING AVAILABILITY OF
CONCERTS- That section is further amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
'(9) for conviction or final adjudication under an antitrust law or unfair trade
practice law of a violation of such law regarding concert venues or concert
promotion.'.
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(c) PROHIBITION- That section is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
'(h) PROHIBITION ON HINDERING AVAILABILITY OF RADIO
PROGRAMMING AND CONTENT AND CONCERTS-
'(1) PROHIBITION- Under such regulations as the Commission shall prescribe,
it shall be unlawful for any licensee or permittee to carry out an act for which
revocation of a license or permit is authorized under paragraph (8) or (9) of
subsection (a).
'(2) PENALTIES- A licensee or permittee that violates paragraph (1) shall be
subject to such penalties under title V as the Commission shall prescribe in
regulations.
'(3) CONSTRUCTION WITH LICENSE REVOCATION AUTHORITY- The
penalties provided under paragraph (2) for an act described in paragraph (1) are
in addition to any other action which the Commission may take under
subsection (a) with respect to such act.'
e) REGULATIONS-
3) ELEMENTS- The regulations under paragraph (1) shall prohibit a licensee or
permittee of a radio station, or affiliate thereof, that has an attributable interest
(as determined under section 73.3555 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations)
in a programming entity or concert venue or concert promotion service from-
(A) improperly influencing the decision of the entity or service, or any musician
or other programming or content provider, to sell, or the price, terms, or
conditions of sale of, satellite cable programming or content or satellite
broadcast programming or content to any other radio station or unaffiliated
concert venue or concert promotion service;
(B) improperly influencing the decision of any musician or other programming
or content provider to sell, or the price, terms, or conditions of sale of, any song,
work, or sound recording, programming, concert performance, or concert
promotion service to any person or entity not affiliated with-
(i) the licensee or permittee;
(ii) an affiliate of the licensee or permittee; or
(iii) an entity in which the licensee or permittee has an attributable interest;
(C) discriminating against a musician or other programming or content provider
that does not agree to enter into a contract or other arrangement with an entity
affiliated with the licensee or permittee, or in which the licensee or permittee
has an attributable interest, that offers concert venue or concert promotion
service;
(D) requiring an exclusive contract or other arrangement with a musician or
other programming or content provider that prevents other radio licensees or
permittees, concert promotion entities, or concert venues from obtaining
programming or content from the musician or other programming or content
provider to the extent that such contract or other arrangement-
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power to revoke the license of any radio station that uses its cross-
ownership of promotion services to discriminate against
musicians, concert promoters, or other radio stations.249 The Act
particularly aims to protect against unfair competition,
discrimination against artists and the increasing costs of concert
tickets. Specifically, critics contend that Clear Channel's practice
of "synergy," leveraging one asset to benefit another, has allowed
the company to "hoard radio programming, concert tickets, access
to stars and concert advertising dollars for itself." '5
At a recent Arena Managers Conference addressing concerns in
the concert industry, Gary Bongiovani, editor/publisher of Pollstar
industry trade magazine, stated that only few could have predicted
the current state and "ills" of the concert and touring business."'
Right now, the industry is dominated by one player, one
company that has managed to aggregate some of the best minds in
the concert business and take control of many of the touring acts.
They are the ones that going to beat you up for the rent and merch
deals, and if you don't give it to them, they'll take the shows
elsewhere. 2
Clear Channel is considered the world's leading producer and
promoter of live entertainment events. 3 After its purchase of SFX
(i) impairs, impedes, or prevents competition in radio programming or content,
concert venues, or concert promotion;
(ii) impairs, impedes, or prevents diversity of programming or content in local
radio markets;
(iii) is unduly long in duration; or
(iv) contains unreasonable renewal or extension provisions.
S. 2691, 107h Cong. § 3 (2002), available at http://www.thomas.loc.gov (last
visited Nov. 25, 2002).
249. Id.
250. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58.
251. Ray Waddell, AMC Confab Panel Discusses Consolidation, Pricing,
Other Aspects of the Industry, BILLBOARD., Oct. 12, 2002, at 17.
252. Id. Panelist Gary Bongiovani was also joined by John Huie, Nashville-
based agent with Creative Artists Agency and Clear Channel Entertainment VPs
Frank Roach and Danny Zelisko. Zelisko "rhetorically interject[ed], 'Who the
hell is he talking about?"'
253. Information regarding Clear Channel's presence in both radio and
entertainment industries can be found at http://clearchannel.com (last visited
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Entertainment for $4.4 billion, it instantly made Clear Channel the
nations' top live-event promoter with $2 billion a year.14 Clear
Channel reaches over 62 million people, through 135 live
entertainment venues, including 44 amphitheaters in the U.S. and
28 in Europe each year. 5 Clear Channel VP Frank Roach
commented that Clear Channel's arena concerts have increased by
30 percent since 2000.1
6
As radio and concert industries began to merge, critics began to
question promotional practices in which radio stations promoted
only artists in which they sponsored. 7 Although artists are not
compelled to give Clear Channel exclusivity over their tours or
individual shows, the silent threat of airtime is a realistic
possibility. Artists fear that not working with Clear Channel
venues will necessitate a blackballing from all Clear Channel radio
stations, an act with potentially devastating effects to any artist. 8
Further, artists have allegedly accepted a smaller concert payments
from Clear Channel in fear of negative repercussions concerning
Nov. 25, 2002); see also Waddell, supra note 251 (quoting Clear Channel VP
Frank Roach's statement, "Ten years ago, nobody had hear of Bob Sillerman,
the initials 'SFX,' or, unless someone lived in central Texas, Clear Channel."
Bob Sillerman, founded SVX/CCE, with the philosophy of spreading into new
markets, make more money, and increase leverage. Basically, Sillerman
"consolidate[d] the great cities").
254. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58.
255. Id.
256. Waddell, supra note 251.
257. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. Rob Buswell, former
Jacor head, would not directly link the anticompetitive practice of concert
booking and radio support, yet he stated: "Having the stations at our disposal is
a nice tool, and its' something that the other promoters in the market don't have
to work with. I don't' really go to artists or managers or agents and say, 'If you
play this show for us versus Universal [now House of Blues], you'll get more
spins for your record.' That's not really what we're all about. But by the same
token, when we have an artist we're promoting, they'll get a lot of on-air
support." Id.
258. Id. Jerry Bakal of Concerts East, and independent promotion company
ii New Jersey, states that he regularly loses bookings because "the bands are
afraid to piss off the radio stations" and because his performance space is
surrounded by Clear Channel-owned venues.
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airplay time."9 Andy Sommers, agent of the Toadies, recognized
airplay as a bargaining chip26° but conceded that Clear Channel
never explicitly made airplay a threat. "I just played the odds," he
says, "and the odds are on their side. Do I feel Clear Channel has
an unfair competitive edge? Absolutely. But I understand what
they're doing. If you own the car dealership and you won the car
wash, it's good business to sell dirty cars."26' The government is
taking notice. In January, Rep Howard L. Berman campaigned the
Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission
to investigate allegations that Clear Channel refused to play artists'
songs if the musicians declined to hire the company as their tour
promoter.262
In a sense, an artist deciding not to sign Clear Channel as their
concert promoter takes a big risk-both in terms of revenue and
airplay. This general notion supports the following statistics of
Clear Channel's dominant position in the concert industry: Clear
Channel produced seven of the top 10 tours and 15 of the top 25.263
In terms of revenues, Clear Channel grossed over $979 million in
the United States for 2001, which accounts for 66.4% of their
revenues for the year.264 Of all the tours in the United States last
259. Id. Boots Hughston, an executive at 2B1 Productions, which owns
Maritime Hall in San Francisco, alleges that Clear Channel throws around its
weight to save money on small-scale shows. "Clear Channel will threaten
agents when we make offers on shows to the point where sometimes they'll
withdraw even after they've signed contracts with us," he says. "I could
probably give you eighty or ninety times where this has occurred-where they'll
threaten the band, tell them, 'If you play Maritime, you will not play for any of
our venues anywhere else, and you'll lose your airplay.' And they'll end up
accepting offers that are a lot less than mine. They'll pass on $30,000 or
$50,000 form us and play for them for $10,000 or $15,000. The agents will be
apologetic-like, 'I'm sorry, they blew a shit fit, this aint' going to work.' And
we end up losing the show."
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58. (Britney Spears is specifically
mentioned in this article as an example of an artists discriminated against for not
using Clear Channel as their tour promoter.)
263. BILLBOARD, supra note 177.
264. Id.
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year, Clear Channel was involved at some level in over half the
tours.265
One way Clear Channel dominates the concert industry over its
competitors is by snapping-up266 concert-promotion companies
with the means to easily out-bid other companies for entire tours
such as 'N Sync, U2 and the Dave Matthews Band.267 Weiner also
alleges that Clear Channel acquired Montage Mountain
Performing Arts Center near Scranton, Pennsylvania at a loss in
order to lock out one of its biggest concert rivals, Covanta
Entertainment. Tom Etter, senior vice president of Covanta stated,
"We all understand we're competitors and competition is rough,
but to us this is completely unparalleled." He added, "[Clear
Channel" can't make money off the Montag contract, which will
probably lose money every year. So why would they do this?
There has to be another motive other than profits." Congressman
Weiner, in response to viewing Metropolitan's financials
concerning their unsuccessful bid, stated "When you start to make
in your self-interest and take losses in order to box out the
competition, that rise to the level of anti-trust behavior. 268
The astronomical fees paid to concert-promotion companies
which in turn land in the hands of artists, have driven ticket prices
up to "Pikes Peak" heights.269 The House Judiciary Committee is
particularly concerned about the "unconscionable ticket prices"
which skyrocketed as a result of the Telecommunications Act.
Congress has also found that rapid consolidation has also
negatively affected concert venues since the signing of the
265. Id. (8,160 concerts were reported in the United States; Clear Channel
was involved in approximately 4,753 of the tours).
266. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
267. Id.
268. Eric Boehlert, Washington tunes in, Salon.com, at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/03/27/beltway [hereinafter Boehlert,
Washington tunes in] (Mar. 27, 2002) (quoting Clear Channel saying that the
idea of willing to lose money is "unfounded," adding, "We're a public company,
we're not going to lose money on a facility for the sake of a small competitor.
To suggest we've done something wong here is absurd").
269. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
270. BILLBOARD, supra note 177.
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Telecom Act. Since 1996, concert ticket prices have "increased by
more than 50 percent more than such prices had increased in any
previous 5 year-period. ' 7' The average concert ticket rose over 30
percent from '98 to '99.172 In the summer of 2000, musical artists
made a conscious effort to keep the prices of concert tickets
down. 73 Yet, at the same time, artists are demanding a huge price
for concerts since most artists make money on live performances
and not CD sales. 74
To appease both the artist and companies such as Clear Channel,
concert tickets are set at an astronomical price. 27' Further, to make
additional revenue, Clear Channel also sets advertising rates at
premium rates. 76 Ticket prices have not yet reached their plateau.
After 9/11, ticket prices rose 11 percent.277 -Ticketmaster will no
longer reap financial benefits from tours if artists continue asking
for a higher price .2" As a result, Ticketmaster, along with concertvenues, have increased new service charge fees and increased the
271. S. 2691, 1071 Cong. § 2 (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last
visited Nov. 25, 2002) From 1991 to 1996, ticket prices increased by 21 percent,
compared to an increase in the Consumer Price Index of approximately 15
percent. From 1996 to 2001, the concert ticket price increased by more that 61
percent, while the Consumer Price Index increased by 13 percent.
272. Eric Boehlert, The Summer of (slightly less expensive) love, Salon.com,
(June 27, 2000, at
http://dir.salon.com/business/feature/2000/06/27/tickets/index.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Boehlert, Summer] ) Despite decreasing overall
attendance, the concert business still profited over $1.2 billion in '99.
273. Id. Limp Bizkit, Pearl Jam and Britney Spears, Creed, Dave Matthews
Band and Christiana Aguilera have tried to keep prices down to $30-$40.
Artists that did not try to keep their prices down, such as KISS at Irvine
Meadows in California and Diana Ross and the Supremes at the National Car
Rental Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida allowed a $9.95 and $15 service fee,
respectively.
274. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Waddell, supra note 251. ("If you thought in the aftermath of 9/11 that
ticket prices would go up 11 0/o-that seems to defy logic," stated Gary
Bongiovani, editor/publisher of Pollstar).
278. Boehlert, Summer, supra note 272.
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prior service fee, which originally covered the cost of the ticket
order.2 79 These fees typically increased the ticket price from 30 to
50 percent.80  Prior to merging with Clear Channel, SFX
dominated the concert tour industry-primarily by owning most
major summer amphitheaters, promoting over 30 tours but also
having some part in over 3,000 shows in a year.28 Seeing that
SFX's power was rapidly expanding in a variety of markets,
Ticketmaster viewed SFX as a potential threat if it chose to create
its own ticketing company.282 In exchange for not competing, SFX
was allowed to pocket service fees, typically around $4 per ticket.
For a sold-out show, this scheme could amount to $100,000 per
show.283
In a recent complaint to the DOJ, Congressman Anthony
Weiner, D-NY, stated that Clear Channel's dominance in the
concert industry is "harmful to consumers, venue owners and
artists.2 84  In the future, one industry expert predicts that
"Ticketmaster may ultimately be a Clear Channel company, or at
least their role. may change.""28 Industry observers accuse Clear
Channel of driving up ticket prices to "new and frightening'
heights" by "paying astronomical amounts to buy entire tours by
279. Id. Service fees could reach up to $9 a ticket. Generally, tickets include
a ticket service fee, plus a facility fee, or "the honor of entering a venue." Some
venues may charge $5.50 per customer. For example, Pearl Jam fights to keep
its ticket prices under $30, a steal among multiplatinum acts. However, a lawn
seat at Saratoga Performing Arts Center in New York includes a $6.05 service
fee, a $5.50 facility fee and a $3.50 handling fee. "That $26 ticket suddenly
costs $40.80-a 56 percent increase over the ticket's face value." A Britney
Spears concert ticket increased 59 percent (from $22 to $35.55) due to service
fees for a June 21 show at Merriweather Post outside of Washington, D.C.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. A sold-out Sting show that housed 15,000 fans, an average ticket
included a $7.50 per ticket service fee and a $3 facility fee.
284. Boehlert, Washington tunes in, supra note 268.
285. Waddell, supra note 251. John Huie, Nashville-based agent with
Creative Artists Agency, spoke at the Arena Managers Conference on
September 22-24 in Phoenix.
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big-name performers." '286 However, Steve Smith, Chief Operating
Officer of Clear Channel Entertainment, denies this blanket
statement and argues that the "arithmetic is fundamentally wrong"
because Clear Channel's "efficiencies" keep concert ticket prices
down.2"7
IV. IMPACT
This section will address legislative conflict regarding
deregulation and public policy goals, particularly concerning Clear
Channel. These conflicts, in addition to current lawsuits and
investigations involving Clear Channel, will illustrate why the
Competition Act is needed. Further, this section will highlight
what legislators and lobbyists have to say about further
deregulation, and in particular, Clear Channel. Secondly, this
section will predict the Competition Act's likelihood of enactment.
In making a prediction, the analysis will address (a) the latest FCC
findings, including the FCC's and DOJ's policy view of
deregulation, (b) the Future of Music Coalition's ("FMC")
findings and (c) Clear Channel's close ties to the Republican party.
Despite the Competition Act's noble effort to return competition,
diversity and integrity to the radio and concert industries, this
section will describe why Congress will not support the Act. The
impact of vetoing the Competition Act will ultimately lead to
further deregulation.
4. Legislative Conflict
When announcing the proposed legislation, Feingold
characterized the Telecom Act as a bill "bought and paid for by
soft money. Everyone was at the table except for the
consumers.""28 Capitol Hill players see little hope for the bill to be
286. Roberts, Playola, supra note 182.
287. Id. ("Guess those 'N Sync tickets you went into debt to buy were
bargains after all").
288. Holland, Payola Due This Month, supra note 140.
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passed, noting that the "battle will be lengthy and expensive." '289 If
the battle will be fought by a powerhouse like Clear Channel,
particularly with the GOP, House and Senate on its side, chances
are the bill will have little chance of being passed. One veteran
stated that the bill was important, but that it would "take certainly
public outrage to fuel it and a couple of years and maybe even a
change in administration to try to wrestle with this one, to keep up
a unified front and not let these issues be peeled away.""0 The
newly elected administration, dominated by GOP in the House, the
Senate, and at the top positions leaves little hope for Feingold,
artists and consumers alike-at least for two more years.
One heavyweight opposing legislation changes, particularly
payola provisions, has the National Association of Broadcasters
already lobbying its position:
We think Congress made the correct decision [in the '96 rewrite]
in allowing an element of consolidation in the radio industry that
was not there before. We think Senator Feingold is flat wrong
when he claims there is less diversity in program formats. The
reality is that there have never been more formats and program
diversity.29
Although insiders suspect that the bill will not pass, Jonathan
Potter, president of the Digital Media Association, believes the
issue will take a .long-term effort. "But counter-balance that with
this: Feingold was told the same thing when he started down the
road of campaign finance reform. So don't ever count Russ
Feingold out.""29
On its face, massive consolidation concerns the FCC. However,
history illustrates that the FCC ultimately approves further
deregulation despite acknowledging that it could potentially harm
the public interest. In 1997, a Dallas investment company, Hicks,
Muse, Tate & Furst Inc., bought SFX Broadcasting, Inc. for $2.1
billion, which at the time, gave the company control over the
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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biggest radio group in the nation.293 The acquisition added 71
stations, bringing its total to 344 stations.9 At the time, SFX
Broadcasting was twice as large as its nearest competitor, which
happened to be Clear Channel.295 What's interesting about this
acquisition, however, was the FCC and Department of Justice's
evident concern that these acquisitions would give too much power
to a few station owners to control local advertising revenue,
programming formats, independent news gatherings and overall
diversity on the airwaves.296 What is perhaps more troubling, is
that in just five years, the FCC and DOJ's apparent concern over a
mere 344 commonly owned stations has diminished, if not
completely vanished. Three years later, the FCC approved Clear
Channel, now the nation's largest radio company, to buy AMFM
for 16.6 billion in stock, which would bring radio station
ownership to 800 nation-wide stations.29 In a time-frame of two
weeks, Clear Channel also announced plans to acquire concert
promoter SFX for $2.9 billion in stock.298 Although the FCC
required Clear Channel to sell 72 stations in 27 markets in the
AMFM acquisition, its consolidation concerns have slowly
diminished since 1996.
The DOJ and FCC continue to express concern with every
merger and acquisition, however, the concern, investigations,
biennial reviews have amounted to Clear Channel acquiring over
1,200 stations.299 How Clear Channel appeased the FCC and DOJ
293. Farhi, Biggest Radio Group, supra note 109.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. Justice officials did challenged aspects of the deal, specifically the
markets in which SFX would control over 40 percent of the local radio
advertising revenue.
297. Radio Giant Clear Channel Agrees to Sell 72 Stations, WASH. POST,
March 7, 2000, at E03.
298. Id.
299. Paul Farhi, EZ Communications Sold for $655 Million; Fairfax Radio
Firm Swept Up in Merger Craze, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1996, at DO1
[hereinafter EZ Communications]. In 1996, rapid consolidation already had the
DOJ inquiring about the effects of mergers on competition. Specifically,
"advertisers have told antitrust officials that they are concerned that prices for
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to reach its total number of stations is fascinating considering that
the government entities were concerned about Westinghouse
Electric Corporations purchase of Infinity Broadcasting for $3.9
billion in 1996, bringing its radio ownership to 77 stations in 13
major markets.3"' Clear Channel boasts over 1,200 stations in 300
markets; the numbers on their own suggest that the only trend the
DOJ and FCC have committed themselves to is further
deregulation and relaxation of ownership limits.
The FCC's decisions in the past also illustrate their tendency
towards deregulation. For instance, in 1999 the practice of payola
was in question when Chancellor Media, one of the largest
broadcasting chains at the time, billed a record label $237,000 for
a marketing campaign specifically geared towards airplay of a
particular song.3°1  In the same year, Cumulus, another
broadcasting giant, made a $1 million deal with an independent
promoter which gave him exclusive rights to lobby for particular
songs with the "decision makers" of the company.0 2 Although the
FCC was urged to look into the matter and subsequently expressed
some concern, legislators contend that the FCC and DOJ prefer to
stand by idly and do nothing.3 3 Three years later, independent
air time will rise substantially in markets controlled by big station operators. A
more general worry is that audiences will lose 'diversity' in radio
programming."
300. Paul Farhi, Justice Department Clears Westinghouse Purchase of
Infinity; $3.9 Billion Deal Would Bring Together Nation's -Two Largest Radio
Station Operators, WASH. POST., Nov. 13, 1996, at A09 [hereinafter Farhi,
Justice Department Clears Westinghouse]; Paul Farhi, Justice Department
Probes Antitrust Implications of Radio Mergers, Wash. Post., Aug. 2, 1996, at
F02 [hereinafter Farhi, Justice Department Probes Antitrust Implications] Joel
Klein, assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department's antitrust
division suggests the DOJ philosophy by stating, "We're here to preserve
competition, not to prevent mergers." In 1996, the DOJ was concerned about a
$770 deal involving Jacor Communications acquisition of Citicasters Inc.
301. Philips & Hiltzik, 2 Officials Urge FCC, supra note 112.
302. Id.
303. Id. Regarding payola, Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minn) states "The
FCC should look into the matter. These are the kinds of things that occur when
there is no real competition. Of all the dangers that go with the increasing
concentration of power in this country, the most dangerous is what is happening
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promotion has become a permanent fixture in the landscape of the
music business. One million dollar deals with independent
promoters are rampant. Tactics to get an edge on competition,
which would have been questionable three years ago, are now
commonplace, if not expected, yet despite so-called investigations,
nothing has yet been done to halt the negative effects of radio and
concert conglomeration.
If the goals of the Telecommunications Act were to appease
artists and consumers, the Act has miserably failed. Throughout
the country, panels are popping up discussing the current trends
and dissatisfaction with radio conglomeration and payola.3" A
general theme emerging from such conferences is the exchange of
information between Washington and radio insiders and
consumers.3"5 This information in turn has spurred Representative
John Conyers (D-MI), who sits on the House Judiciary Committee,
to call for extensive investigation of independent promotion,
payola and radio conglomeration.0 6
With Clear Channel's history of huge acquisitions and eventual
dominance in numerous entertainment industries, it's no wonder
that insiders have questioned the company's practices with
suggestions of unfair trade and antitrust concerns. Radio speaking
in the telecommunications industry." Representative John Conyers states "The
idea that radio stations may have invented new ways of accepting pay-for-play
confirms my worst fears about merger mania. Everywhere media
conglomerates have gained ground, consumers have lost ground. I don't think
Congress should stand by idly."
304. Cobo, supra note 181; see also Pareles, Many Futures of Music, supra
note 186. The Billboard/Airplay Monitor Seminar took place in response to the
uniform dissAtisfaction with the music business. Between March 14-16, over
750 people attended the conference at the Eden Roe Resort in Miami Beach.
The second annual Future of Music Policy Summit, sponsored by the Future of
Music Coalition at Georgetown University, also addressed issues concerning
radio conglomeration, artists' unfair contracts and payola.
305. Cobo, supra note 181. John Conyers, keynote speaker of the
conference, stated "Our meeting is to share some news of what happens in
Washington as it relates to your industry and what happens to you so I can take
[it] back to my colleagues in Washington, D.C."
306. Id. Conyers has been calling for a congressional investigation of
independent promotion since January.
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alone, however, Clear Channel's approximate 1,225 radio stations
account for just 10% of the nation's total."7
Clear Channel is "drawing fire from plenty of folks other than
amateur comedians.""3 8 In 2001, Nobody in Particular Presents
("NIPP"), a Denver concert-promoter, charged Clear Channel with
a number of "unlawful and anti-competitive practices.""3 9 This suit
is the first to accuse Clear Channel of violating monopoly and/or
anti-trust statutes.31 0 "Somebody has to take them on, and it might
as well be us," stated NIPP founder Kauffinan. "This company's
always fought the good fight; it's epitomized independence and the
entrepreneurial spirit, and we feel we have the right to do business
without unfair interference. This is America, is it not?"'
NIPP argues that Clear Channel's monopolistic empire prevents
it from competing in the Denver market. NIPP alleges that (1)
Clear Channel threatens airplay if artists do sign Clear Channel as
their concert promoter; (2) Clear Channel offers artists "more than
100 percent of gross sales to promote their concerts," making it
impossible for NIPP and other companies to bid on the shows; (3)
Clear Channel limits competitor's advertising on its stations,
charges excessive advertising rates, offered only "undesirable
timings and placements or eliminated [advertising availability]
completely; (4) excluded NIPP artists from their 'concert
calendars'; and (5) eliminated promotions for artists promoted by
NIPP.312  Ron Rodriques, Radio & Records editor-in-chief,
recognizes that radio stations that "loathe Clear Channel is simply
an understatement. Dirty tactics like placing frozen turkeys on
307. Leeds, Am Empire, supra note 58.
308. Michael Roberts, PAC-ing a Punch; Clear Channel's formation of a
political action committee shows it's ready for battle, Westword.com, (June 20,
2002), at http://www.westword.com/issues/2002-06-
20/message.html/I/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Roberts,
PAC-ing a Punch].
309. Id.
310. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. West-vord highlights such particular instances in which Clear
Channel is accused of perpetuating alleged acts of misconduct with competitors:
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competitors' lawns with signs reading, "Unlike this bird, your
goose is cooked. This will be your last Thanksgiving in
Colorado,"3"4 acts in the name of competition seem to be condoned
by Clear Channel." 5
Even if NIPP obtains the money to stay afloat against Clear
Channel, insiders speculate that the odds of victory are slim.3"6
Considering that Clear Channel's second quarter radio division
revenues increased 96 percent to $941 million, CBS Radio legal
analysts states that NIPP's lawsuit against Clear Channel is "the
beginning of a very, very long expensive, drawn-out, bitter brawl,
and when it's over, if it's over in our lifetime, it's going to have a
(1) Classic-rock station the "Hawk" sponsored the "Big Rock Show."
Apparently, a truckload of rocks was conveniently placed in front of Fiddler's
Green's ticket windows with a sign that read: "You want a Big Rock Show?
Here are some big rocks." Additionally, counterfeit all-access passes and fliers
stating that anyone who announced "The Hawk sucks" would receive' two beers
for the price of one infiltrated the concert; (2) Denver station, the "Peak"
(previously an SFX station, now owned by Clear Channel), sponsored a
Fillmore Auditorium concert where hundreds of pounds of raw fish were
deposited in the band equpment loading area; (3) Clear Channel allegedly sent
out bogus faxes detailing unauthorized promotions to agents, manages, or band
representatives with the intent to confuse or insult artists; (4) Two instances of
alleged Clear Channel vandalism, including one in which a Peak van was
splashed with chemicals, requiring hundreds of dollars to fix and an incident
involving two youths attempting to set fire to a Peak recreational vehicle.
Apparently, the youths ran to a Clear Channel station's tent; (5) Stephen Meade,
a morning-show host for KBPI was convicted of animal cruelty for dropping a
chicken form an upper floor at Clear Channel's headquarters in 1999. Meade
also allegedly attacked Rover MacDaniels, former DJ at the Peak, at a Denver
restaurant and began "pummeling him." Along with other incidents of
harassment and threatening phone calls, a restraining order required Meade to
stay at least hundred yards away from MacDaniels and his produce for the next
year.
314. Id.
315. Id. ("At some companies, a restraining order under these circumstances
might jeopardize a career. At Clear Channel, it means job security").
316. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56. One sources states,
"These guys can crush you from so many angles it's incredible. They sit there
and look you in the eye and basically tell you they'll fluck with you. They're
just evil fucks."
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significant impact on one side or the other."3 '7 Yet NIPP is willing
to battle it out with the radio giant. "There's going to be a battle.
This is what's been happening in the real world ever since the
creation of capitalism: There's been a tendency to monopolize and
structure the markets in order to make more profits. That's why
we have the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act."3 8  Instead of
giving into the fight like many of their peers, NIPP concludes that
they are the "last of the Mohicans."3 9
Clear Channel's spokeswoman, Pay Taylor, publicly responded
to the lawsuit: "We haven't done anything wrong, and we'll
vigorously defend ourselves in court. We compete hard, but we
compete fairly. I'm sorry that this had to go to court, because
we'd rather fight this out in the marketplace, where it belongs.""32
NIPP is not the only company to recently file a lawsuit against
Clear Channel.32" '
Clear Channel's co-CEO responded to monopolistic concerns
stating, "We are satisfied and excited about the ways we have
grown our business. Our company competes aggressively, fairly,
and totally within the law. If there is an investigation, we're
confident this will continue to be proven tre."3 2 Clear Channel is
not foreign to lawsuits. At any given time, the company has 300
pieces of ongoing litigation.3u Steve Smith, COE of Clear
Channel in October 2001, states, "[We] will do things tomorrow
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. In the News, BILLBOARD, Sept. 21, 2002, at 6. In September 2002,
Spanish -language radio network Spanish Broadcasting System ("SBS") also
filed a lawsuit against Clear Channel Communications in response to Univision
Communication's announcement that it would acquire SBS's primary
competitor's Hispanic Broadcasting Corp. (HBC). The Tichenor family and
CCC are HBC's principal shareholders. SBS claims antitrust and unfair
competition, yet CCC fied a motion in U.S. District Court on August 29
dismissing the claim for failure to state a claim "upon which relief can be
granted."
322. BILLBOARD, supra note 177.
323. Mandel, supra note 55.
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that will have the potential to offend or shock you-that you will
think are inappropriate. But we'll also do something tomorrow
that you will think is brilliant, genius, great work... My
suggestion is to just judge us by our body of work."3"4 Infinity
chief executive, Mel Karmazin, adds, "I find it extraordinary that
anyone would sue the words 'antitrust' and 'radio' in the same
sentence."325
Congress is also taking notice of Clear Channel's proclivity
towards monopolistic behavior.3"6 Representative Howard Berman
(D-CA) wrote to Attorney General John Ashcroft and Michael
Powell, and asked the DOJ and FCC to investigate Clear
Channel's business practices, particularly the 'persistent
allegations that record companies often must pay radio stations to
play music of their artists." '327 Berman further alleged that Clear
Channel's consolidations have "negatively affected recording
artists, owners of sound-recording copyrights, consumers,
advertisers, and competitors in the radio and television
industries." '328 The House Judiciary Committee urged Ashcroft and
Powell to "fully and aggressively investigate these allegations and
vigorously prosecute any wrongdoing." '329 In particular, Clear
Channel is under fire for denying artists airplay if they do not sign
Clear Channel on as their concert promoter.33 In addition, Berman
is concerned that Clear Channel is purchasing radio and television
stations through "shell corporations" in order to skirt the FCC
station-ownership limit rules.33'
324. Roberts, Playola, supra note 182.
325. Paul Farhi, Top 2 Radio Station operators to Merge in $4.9 Billion
Deal, WASH. POST, June 21, 1996, at AO1 [hereinafter Farhi, Top 2 Radio
Station operators].
326. Id. (Representative Rick Boucher (D-VI) and John Conyers (D-MI_
have also voiced similar concerns.
327. Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!, supra note 128.
328. Roberts, Taking on the Empire, supra note 56.
329. BILLBOARD, supra note 177.
330. Id.
331. Id.; see generally Jeff Leeds, Clear Channel Drawing Static; Radio No.
1 broadcaster disputes critics who say it conceals stations to evade FCC
ownership caps, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, § 3, at 1. Advertising and
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This current investigation will not be Clear Channel's first
challenge. In the late 1990's the DOJ conducted an informal
inquiry of antitrust allegations, and more recently, the NIPP's
ongoing lawsuit in Denver has attracted the DOJ's attention. NIPP
partner Jesse Morreale reported that the DOJ has contacted many
people in the industry, including NIPP, to gather information about
what is happening.332 Morreale noted, "The more large-scale the
problem, the more focus and attention it gets, and there are clearly
indications from the Justice Department that they have concerns
about what's happening with Clear Channel." '333 In addition,
Anthony Weiner (D-NY), became the second congressman to urge
the DOJ to conduct an investigation of Clear Channel last
March.3 In the same week, the FCC denied Clear Channel a
competing broadcast companies have petitioned the FCC to review Clear
Channel's alleged practice of "warehousing" front companies. Arthur
Belendiuk, a Washington communications attorney that filed petitions opposing
Clear Channel's purchase of two stations, stated, "The problem is that you have
a company that's been told not to own radio stations in certain markets and has
decided it's going to control those radio stations anyway." Clear Channel's
spokeswoman, Pam Taylor, responded stating, "The FCC has reviewed every
one of our transactions and we've abided by the rules. We just happen to be
really good at maximizing flexibility under the rules that are in place." Yet even
though Clear Channel owns "approximately" 1,225 stations, the company
admits that it controls sales or programming at an additional 75 stations; local
marketing agreements allow Clear Channel to take over another station's
programming or advertising time. Clear Channel is accused of controlling
"obscure companies" buying the company's divested stations. In addition, joint
advertising agreements allegedly allow Clear Channel to take full control of the
station's management. In one instance, Belenduik's petition alleges that one
station that Clear Channel agreed to divest, KBRQ-FM in Waco, Texas,
continues to employ Clear Channel employees, including management,
according to an employment record and web site. Andrew Jay Schwartzman,
president of Media Access Project, a consumer advocacy law firn, stated that
the 1996 Telecom Act "was supposed to end these evasions by making the
broadcaster limits high enough to satisfy all but the greediest ... The greediest
have kept at it."
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Boehlert, Washington tunes in, supra note 268.
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station purchase, "citing concerns about media concentration. 335
For the first time in 30 years, the FCC appointed an administrative
law judge to hear the issue.336 The DOJ's recent pro-activity may
seem promising, however Clear Channel's history along with the
current state of bureaucracy shows that DOJ and FCC may be on
their side. First, Powell, who heads the FCC, generally favors
deregulation. Also, the DOJ's current antitrust chief, Charles
James, as a Washington antitrust attorney, formerly represented
Clear Channel when it acquired AMEM Inc. and SFX in 2002.337
Thus, one could realistically argue that Clear Channel, although
investigated, will not be independently prosecuted by the DOJ or
FTC.
The legislature is also paying attention to other industry
concerns. John Conyers (D-MI) urges Congress to readdress
payola.338 Conyers hopes to hold federal hearings to address
payola and its negative effects on artists, consumers, and record
labels. Insiders suggest that Congress will do nothing to curb the
negativity surrounding the music industry, specifically payola.339
"There's nothing illegal about the practice, and with the Justice
Department focusing on identifying terrorist cells and Congress
embroiled in wartime security matters, attempts to create
regulations or pass bills curtailing it aren't even near the stove, let
alone on a back burner. 340
Feingold faces an upward battle in passing this new legislation.
Although radio consolidation means less diversity and fewer
voices, insiders note that this fact is "irrelevant because if you look
at the overall media marketplace, there have never been so many
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58.
338. Chuck Philips, Conyers to Press for Tougher Enforcement Laws on
Payola; Broadcasting: Ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee
plans to call hearings this year, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 2002, .§ 3, at 1 [hereinafter
Philips, Conyers].
339. Roberts, Playola, supra note 182.
340. Id.
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voices."34' When reviewing the radio and concert industry,
Congress will choose their statistics, it will choose how to define
the market, whether locally or nationally, rock or pop, or all
stations as a whole. Somehow, Congress, particularly the new
Congress, will find a new diversity of voices a variety in
programming, and incentives, including financial, to approve
further deregulation.342
Although the legislature and consumers have urged the FCC to
take action, history shows little, if anything, will be done to
regulate the radio and concert industry.
B. The Future of the Competition Act. the likelihood of
Congressional Support
Massive consolidation plagued the radio and concert industries.
Since 1996, decisions made contrary to public interest have
resulted in a decline of competition and diversity. Both industry
players and consumers have asked for government intervention.
Senator Feingold is the first to tackle the difficult job of amending
the Communication Act of 1934 and thereby reversing the
negative effects of the Telecom Act of 1996. Yet in an era where
Republicans dominate the House, Senate and the presidency, the
Act will have difficulty passing. This section will discuss (i)
341. Steve Knoll, Radio Station Consolidation: Good News for Owners, but
What About Listeners?, N.Y. TIMES, date, § D, at 5. Industries that are
regulated are excited about the FCC revisiting ownership rules. (from Brooks
Boliek, FCC launches wide review of broadcast ownership rules, HOLLYWOOD
REP., Sept. 13, 2002.) David Bartlett, president of Radio-Television News
Directors Association, states, "We are pleased the FCC is undertaking a review
of all of its broadcast ownership rules," stated Viacom in a statement.
"Flexibility in the broadcast marketplace is critical in today's highly diverse
media environment, particularly in light of changes that have taken place over
the years. We look forward to demonstrating to the commission that the current
rules are both arbitrary and outdated."
342. Boliek, supra note 341. -Consumers Union's Gene Kimmelman stated,
"There's a selectivity here of picking the facts that will support a result. Powell
has an inclination to pick the facts that favor deregulation and ignore the facts
that don't."
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current FCC studies, (ii) the Future of Music Coalition's recent
study and (iii) Clear Channel's ties with the Republican party in
order to determine the likelihood of passage.
1. The FCC Studies and Policy Views
On Thursday, September 12, 2002, the FCC officially kicked off
a comprehensive review of broadcast ownership rules. 43 Despite
the FCC's extensive inquiry, the "majority of commissioners
signal that they support relaxing or consolidating at least some of
the decades-old restrictions." In an effort to take special care with
the Federal Communications Commission review of broadcast
industries, Powell urges artists, entertainers, and any other stake
holder to submit information and analysis to the FCC so it can
make an informed decision expected spring 2003. 34" Writer Guild
of America West president Victoria Riskin agrees with Powell to
the extent that this process should involve an extensive analysis
requiring time, however, she adds:
We should also weigh decades of precedent and wisdom in
rulemaking that has served the public interest. We cannot allow
this process to be manipulated by a few megacorporations that
seek to control even larger sectors of our communication
industries. The new ownership rules should enhance free
competition and move America toward greater diversity of
viewpoints in the media, not toward putting the power to decide
what all Americans see on television and read in the newspapers
into the boardrooms of a handful of powerful individuals. 45
Furthermore, "the rules were written to encourage diversity of
voices on the airwaves and competition among media outlets, and
343. Edmund Sanders, FCC Reviewing Rules Governing Media Ownership,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, § 3, at 1 The comprehensive inquiry involves an
examination of the television, newspaper and radio markets. However, due to
court decision concerning cable TV systems, TV stations, and wireless
communication, it appears as if radio programming, diversity and ownership
may take a backseat to other forms of broadcasting.
344. Boliek, supra note 341.
345. Id.
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to prevent the biggest companies from becoming too powerful in
controlling news and entertainment."3 6
What appears to be crucial at this point is the number of
responses and the lobbying efforts on behalf of artists and
consumers. In particular Leonard Hill, chairman of the legislative
affairs committee of the Caucus of Producers, Writers and
Directors, warns all those affected in the creative community that
these decision made in the next six months will have
unprecedented impact on the creative community as a whole.347
"Next Thursday, the agency is expected to approve an order that
starts the rule-making process. While it does not specify the
direction the agency intends to take as it reconsiders the rules,
experts say that they have no doubt that the proceedings are all but
certain to conclude next year with most of the regulations either
abandoned or broadly loosened."34 This fear should be even more
apparent with the recent changes in the Senate and House, which
suggests that these decisions will effectively create lasting policies
for at least two more years, and potentially longer if there is not an
administrative change.
On the other hand, some insiders speculate that Powell will look
at further deregulation critically.
The move begins to fulfill the long-held vision of Michael K.
Powell, the agency's chairman. As an FCC commissioner during
the 1990's and as chairman under President Bush, Mr. Powell has
consistently voiced deep skepticism about the ownership rules,
346. Stephen Labaton, FCC Weighs a Sharp Easing of Size Limits on Big
Media, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, Section C, at 1.
347. Boliek, supra note 341. Leonard Hill states, "The proceeding should set
off alarms within the creative community. The prospect of wholesale
deregulation ahs grave implications for all those who produce, write, act, direct
or compose entertainment. The battle will be between the corporations, who
seek deregulation that will allow consolidation and self-dealing, and the creative
community that is dependent on regulations that maintain competition and
access to the national audience. I am concerned that the corporations have
amassed an army of lobbyists to make the case for deregulation when the
creative community seems blissfully unaware of the significant decisions that
will be made by the FCC in the next six months.
348. Labaton, supra note 346.
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saying that they were based more on a hunch and intuition than on
strong empirical evidence that they actually promote diversity and
competition. At least two other members of the five-person
commission are also known to be critical of the old rules. 49
Powell himself notes, "the time is up for continuing to wink at
public policy. It's now time to embrace it and make it. ' 350 He
adds, "I pride myself on being open-minded."35' Yet many
analysts believe that the proceedings have already set a course for
further deregulation.3 52 Further, "what is less certain-and what
will be--critical, is both where and how the FCC draws the line on
consolidation," analyst Blair Levin commented. 353
Levin contends that Powell recognizes the need for new rules to
accommodate the new media world.354 Yet, in its request for
comments in the Notice for Proposed Rule Making, the FCC is
questioned whether it has the authority to exercise public interest
goals of diversity and competition. Public policy considerations,
however, have been implicit in decisions regarding radio
ownership since the Communications Act of 1934. Questions such
of these demonstrate a potential bias towards further deregulation.
The FCC recently released twelve empirical studies examining
the media marketplace, including how media ownership affects
diversity, localism and competition. Artists, owners, record label
executives, independent promoters and even consumers are
encouraged to comment on this study as part of the third Biennial
349. Id.
350. Boliek, supra note 341. In regard to ownership rules of broadcast
properties, including television, newspaper, and radio stations.
351. Id.
352. Id. Blair Levin, a Legg-Mason analyst and former FCC staffer who
tracks media states, "The direction of the proceeding is clear-greater
deregulation of media ownership that will lead to greater consolidation and a
dramatic restructuring of the marketplace.
353. Id.
354. Labaton, supra note 346. ("Powell has had a very clear point of view
throughout the term at the commission, which is that a lot of these rules need to
be looked at right away and most of them are no longer valid." He continued,
"He [Powell] believes the media world has changed dramatically and needs a
strong look").
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Regulatory Review of Broadcast Ownership Rules, from which the
FCC will develop ownership rules and policies. Chairman Michael
Powell has taken extensive steps to understand the current media
market place. Powell contends that this examination is the most
comprehensive review ever initiated by the FCC.355 Powell
contends that the data collected will help develop sound public
policy.3 6 The Media Ownership Working Group, headed by Paul
Gallant, will use the public comments in conjunction with the
empirical studies to advance the FCC's "understanding of the key
factual areas of media ownership policy."
As predicted, the FCC studies support further deregulation. 57
Specifically, the studies suggest an increase in outlets and a
decrease in the average number of radio stations has not affected
format diversity. Since 1960, the number of media outlets, radio
stations, television stations, newspapers, cable systems, and DBS
operators, have increased by 195%, and the number of independent
owners have increased by 139%. Yet, the FCC found that the
average number of radio station owners decreased.358 In response
to lack of diversity complaints, the FCC contends that the average
number of formats has actually remained the same since 1996. 359
Despite an increase in advertising prices, studies find that national
concentration does not appear to increase advertising prices; in
355. Id. ("This effort is the most comprehensive look at media ownership
regulation ever undertaken by the FCC. As the courts have made clear, it is
critical that the FCC has a solid factual base to support its media ownership
rules ").
356. Id. ("Collectively, these studies represent an unprecedented data
gathering effort to better understand market and consumer issues so that we may
develop sound public policy").
357. Id. ("Mr. Powell has set up a special task force and commissioned a set
of studies that many lawyers and experts expect will conclude that they are no
longer necessary to promote diversity and competition. The studies are
expected to be completed next month").
358. FCC Studies, available at www.fcc.gov (last visited Nov. 25, 2002)
[hereinafter The FCC Studies]. Between 1996 and 2002, the average number of
radio station owners in each market decreased from 13.5% to 9.9.
359. Id. During the same period, the average number of formats remained
virtually unchanged (10.1 formats in 1996 vs. 10.2 in 2002).
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fact, large national owners seem to decrease advertising rates in
national and regional markets.360 In 1996, the largest station owner
in each market received an average of 35.6% of radio advertising
revenue.36' In 2002, the largest owner receives 46.8% of such
revenue."
362
Further, the FCC studies find that diversity in programming and
format have changed only slightly since 1996. The most
significant piece of evidence that the FCC may rely on for further
deregulation is the finding that radio programming diversity
increased slightly from 9.26 to 9.32, or 0.74% during 1996-
2001.363 Yet the study also shows a decrease of 2.4% in the
diversity of songs within the same format across local markets and
an "increase of 11.48% in the diversity of songs within the same
format within each local market."3" Moreover, the FCC's
questionnaire noted a "debate" regarding the "relationship between
consolidation and viewpoint and source diversity. '36' The
Commission has historically held that multiple owners are more
likely to provide "divergent viewpoints on controversial issues,"
which are "essential to democracy. 3 6 Yet, the Commission also
has noted the contrary view that a single entity owning multiple
stations in a market has "commercial incentive to air more diverse
programming to appeal to all substantial interests. 367 Perhaps the
most valuable input is from the consumers themselves. Yet it is
highly doubtful that the average radio listener or concert-goer will
expend extensive time and money to comply with the FCC's
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. The FCC Studies, supra note 358.
365. Id. Viewpoint diversity "ensures that the public has access to 'a wide
range of diverse and antagonistic opinions and interpretations."
366. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, Second Report & Order, 50 FCC 2d 1046, 1074 ( 99)
(1975), available at
http://www.fcc.gov.Bureaus/MassMedia/Notices/200 1/fccO 1329.txt.
367. 16 FCC Rcd 19861, 19877.
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public comment requirements. The restrictions suggest that the
only contributors could potentially be the radio stations
themselves. Thus, these studies, although admirable, suggest that
further deregulation of ownership limits is imminent despite public
and industry outcry.
2. The Future of Music Coalition Study
In response to the FCC's third biennial review of broadcast
ownership rules and a series of studies supporting further
deregulation, the Future of Music Coalition36 responded with its
own 145-page comprehensive report detailing how the Telecom
Act resulted in less competition, fewer viewpoints and less
diversity in radio programming, and a loss of localism.369 The
study, entitled "Radio Deregulation: Has it Served Citizens and
Musicians?," was filed at the FCC as a public comment.37 The
study serves as a reminder to those who enacted the Telecom Act
that deregulation's original goals were competition and diversity in
programming and viewpoints. The 1996 FCC Chair who led the
Commission during the Telecom Act's passage stated:
We are fostering innovation and competition in radio... The
Commission's goal in this proceeding is to further competition,
just as we seek to promote competition in other communications
industries we regulate. But in our broadcast ownership rules we
also seek to promote diversity in programming and diversity in the
viewpoints expressed on this powerful medium that so shapes our
culture.37
1
368. DiCola and Thompson, supra note 6. The Future of Music Coalition is
a Washington, DC-based not-for-profit organization consisting of members
from the music, technology, public policy and intellectual property law
communities. "The FMC seeks to educate media organizations, policymakers
and the public about music/technology issues while bringing together diverse
voices to develop creative solutions to challenges in this space."
369. Id. at 1.
370. Id.'at 68. The Behavior Research Center, a private research firm,
conducted 500 in-depth telephone interviews. The interviewees were chosen at
random throughout the United States.
371. Id. FCC Chairmn Rdd Hundt, Speech entitled,"The Hard Road Ahead,"
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The FMC study suggests that "deregulation has not met the
aspiration and stated goals of Congress and the FCC. Susan Ness,
a former FCC commissioner adds, "The unintended consequences
[of the act] have changed irrecoverably the face of radio. 3 72 The
study illustrates that the Telecom Act effectively reduced
ownership and initiated cost-cutting methods utilized by radio
stations, such as voicetracking and syndication, leading to a loss in
localism and "bland and formulaic" radio, less competition, and
less diversity. 73
A single article devoted entirely to the FMC study would not
sufficiently address the detailed findings in full. However, there
are several aspects of the study that directly conflict with the
recent FCC studies that are worth noting. In addition, considering
that no other public comment has been filed on behalf of
consumers and artists, this study could potentially act as the FCC's
only mechanism to evaluate the opposing side of radio
conglomerates such as Clear Channel. Considering the FCC's pro-
deregulatory stance, it is unclear how much weight, if any, the
FCC will afford the FMC study. The major findings support
enactment of the Telecom Act.
The FMC findings criticize the Telecom Act's effect on
consolidation. With two parent companies, Clear Channel and
Viacom, controlling 42% and 45% of industry revenues, in
addition to four firms controlling 70 % of the market share or
greater, the concentration levels and industry revenues indicate
that the market is controlled by a strong oligopoly."4 "The
stronger the oligopoly, the greater the potential harm to the public
and to local businesses." In some instances, four firms control
between 95 percent and 100 percent of the listeners. 5 Further,
since four firms dominate over 50 percent of the audience share,
(Dec. 26, 1996), in PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE'S, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 289 (Guilford Press) (1999).
372. Boehlert, Happy Channel, supra note 27.
373. DiCola and Thompson, supra note 6, at 13-14.
374. Id. at 3, 34. The top four firms in terms of revenue are Clear Channel
(over $3 billion), Viacom (over $2 billion), Cox and Etercom.
375. Id. at 34.
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the oligopoly becomes the "gatekeeper" in determining what we
hear on air."'
Although the FCC found an increase in format variety, thus
inferring an increase in diversity, the FMC's study is critical of
traditional vague notions of "format variety" and "programming
variety." Format variety consists of the number of formats
available in each geographic market.377 The study contends that
format variety is not equivalent to diversity.378 Different formats
may have similar playlists. For example, a Contemporary Hit
Radio ("CHR")/Rhythmic format and an Urban format share over
76% of their respective playlists.379 In effect, a Clear Channel
Urban station, a Clear Channel CHR Pop station, a Clear Channel
CHRlrhythmic and even a Clear Channel Rock station could
potentially play Eminem's "Lose Yourself' simultaneously all in
one market.380 Further, this example does not account for instances
in which "radio companies regularly operate two or more stations
with the same format in the same geographic market."38'
Therefore, two Clear Channel stations in one market could have
identical playlists. Although there may be an overall increase in
376. Id. at 39-40.
377. Id. at 4.
378. Id.
379. DiCola and Thompson, supra note, at 6.
380. Id. at 4; see also
http://www.mrn.247.com/mnrweb/AllAccess/Charts.asp?format=hlR (last
visited Nov. 25, 2002) For the week of November 18-24, Eminem's single,
"Lose Yourself," received over 9,197 spins on 1,000 stations. Mediabase is a
research service that tallies the number of spins each song receives and reports
when and what radio stations add new songs to their playlists.; see also Jeff
Leeds, title, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, Business, at 1. Five major record labels
pay about $15 million a year for racking services. 'Tlaylists have a domino
effect on music promotion campaigns, record store retail orders, concert
bookings and bonuses awarded to record label promotion executives." In an
effort to earn more revenue and industry power, Clear Channel bought
Mediabase in 1997. "Record executives say Clear Channel's aggressive push
for Mediabase is the latest example of how the industry giant is using its size
and reach to tap into the tens of millions of dollars spent on radio promotion by
major record labels."
381. DiCola and Thompson, supra note, at 4.
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formats, it certainly is not indicative of diversity of playlists.
The FMC study reports that commercial radio playlists keep
approximately 40-60 songs in rotation at a time. The FMC asked
respondents the following:
Many commercial radio stations today have a short playlists,
which means they play a limited number of songs and repeat them
often during the week. Other stations have a long playlist, which
means they play a greater variety and have less repletion during
the week. Which type of station do you prefer-those with a short
or long playlist?
Over 78 percent of respondents surveyed said they prefer radio
stations that have long playlists as opposed to short playlists.382
Further, 84 percent of listeners under 30 favor long playlists 3" In
addition, listeners desire to hear a wider range of music that
includes local musicians38 4, and want longer playlists with more
variety.3 85
The FMC also reported that format consolidation concerns
consumers. Specifically, consolidation results in less competition
and less innovation in playlists 86 Format consolidation leads to
"less diversity and less interest. This lack of innovation and
diversity in playlists-what we call format homogeneity or
"creeping sameness"--has become a reality. Format oligopolies
reinforce creeping sameness, diminishing the quality of radio for
consumers." '387 Despite the FMC's findings, stations such as Clear
Channel insist that "diverse playlists would be a waste of time and
money." '388 Radio programmers assume that serving the public
382. Id. at 76.
383. Id. Listeners under the age of 30 are a target demographic.
384. Id. A quarter of respondents said they hear too little of the music they
like. Further, "38 percent said that local artists are underexposed on the radio."
385. Id.
386. Id. at 36.
387. DiCola and Thompson, supra note, at 36.
388. Id. at 78. Randy Michaels, former CEO of Clear Channel, states, "I
think that putting stations in the hands of people who are committed to public
service and who are top broadcasters is good for the public. When we were in
the Mom-and-Pop era, half the radio stations were owned by people who were
as interested in playing what they liked as opposed to really serving the public.
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interest consists of supplying listeners with only the "hits." Steve
Smith, Production Director/Imaging Director of Clear Channel,
states:
Radio is categorized, and it ought to be. Only a slim number of
people would like to hear Ja Rule, Rusted Root, Barry Manilow
and Dwight Yoakam on the same radio station. If you are actually
looking for a station that will play Norah Jones, B-Tribe, Ned
Otter, etc., then look for your closest college radio station. Give
them a good listen. I guarantee you that after 30 minutes of pure
hell, you will switch back to a Clear Channel Radio station,
because we play the hits.
On the other hand, one can argue that listening to Nelly's "Hot
in Herre" every hour on the hour this past summer made the day at
the beach barely tolerable. Playlist diversity and repetitiveness of
music may have contributed to the 17 percent decrease in radio
listening over the past 13 years.389
The FMC is the first comprehensive public opinion survey on
radio in the past twenty years. John Nichols, author and media
scholar, notes,
The Future of Music Coalition has exposed to which
concentration of ownership and rank commercialism has denied
the democratic promise of radio. This is a breakthrough study that
will be referenced for years to come as the document that
quantified a growing sense of unease with what radio has
become.39" '
The FCC should give considerable weight to the FMC study
when determining future broadcasting policy. The study speaks on
When you have professional management, who is focused on serving the
listener, then of necessity we are obsessed with what the public wants, and we
work every day to give them what they want." (citing Greg Kot, Rocking
Radio's World, CHIC. TRIB., April 14,2002).
389. Id. at 78. From "Don't Blame Satellite Radio for Lost Audience Share,"
Radio and Records website, September 16, 2002.
390. Id. at 68.
391. Future of Music Coalition Press Release, Commercial Radio Station
Ownership Consolidation Shown to Harm Artists and the Public, Says FMC
Study, Nov. 18, 2002, at
http://www.futureofrnusic.com/news/PRradiostudy.cfin.
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behalf of consumers, artists and record labels angered by the
Telecom Act's negative effects on the radio industry. The research
illustrates that consolidation has unequivocally harmed radio in
terms of less competition, fewer viewpoints, and less diversity in
programming.392 More importantly, the research demonstrates that
the Act has not served the "diverse needs of American citizens."
Enacting the Competition Act would direct the FCC to reaffirm its
commitment serve the public interest.By Congress enacting the
Competition Act, the FCC would reaffirm its commitment to
serving the public interest.
3. Clear Channel's Ties to the Republican Party
Insiders suggest that losing the House in 1994 instigated the
revival of media deregulation.393 During the 1994 Republican
revolution, Newt Gingrich and legislative leaders, began working
on new media deregulation, which evolved into the Telecom
Act.394 With Republicans now controlling the House and Senate,
in addition to President Bush and Powell traditionally favoring
deregulation, new media deregulatory legislation will be presented,
and will pass.395
Clear Channel's power to leverage into numerous entertainment
industries, along with unprecedented domination in the radio
markets often leaves critics wondering how and why its actions
have not only been tolerated, but approved by the FTC for so long.
Feingold contends that soft money originally bought the 1996
Telecommunications Act.3 96  Yet analysts also contend that L.
392. Dicola and Thompson, supra note 6, at 5.
393. Boehlert, Happy Channel, supra note 27. Critics often blame Hillary
Clinton's healthcare blunder for the 1994 Republican revolution. Within hours
of losing the House, Gingrich already began working on deregulation
legislation. Former FCC chairman Reed Hundt stated, "Losing the House in '94
was without question a seminal moment in the political history of the media."
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. 148 CONG. REc. S6252 (daily Ed. June 27, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Feingold).
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Lowry May's, Clear Channel's founder, strong political ties to the
Republican Party and President Bush prevent the FCC from
closely watching or punishing Clear Channel.397  For instance,
President Bush, while governor for Texas, appointed Mays to a
state technology council in 1996."' 8 Additionally, two years later,
Mays contributed $51,000 to Bush's 1998 gubernatorial
campaign. 99 L. Lowry Mays and president Mark Mays have given
over $100,000 in soft money donations to the Republican party
since 1999."' 0 In addition, Mays lends a heavy hand in local San
Antonio politics as well.4" '  Further, many Clear Channel
executives and companies, that work closely with the radio
conglomerate, such as Eller Media, have also contributed
significant amounts of money to the Republican party in the last
six years.402
397. Leeds, An Empire, supra note 58.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400.. Operator of Stations Pulling Dem Ads has Strong Ties to GOP, Bush,
THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 3, 2001, at DS8. The Center for Responsive
Politics, a Washington nonprofit research group based in Washington that tracks
political donations, found that Clear Channel gave the Republican National
Committee $80,000 on June 20, 2000. L. Lowry Mays contributed $8,950 on
January 30 and $3,206 on January 18, and $2,500 on February 1, 2001. More
specifically, Mays gave President Bush $1,000 on March 16, 1999 and another
thousand on May 4, 2000. Mays' wife, Peggy, contributed $20,000 solely to
Bush in addition to thousands given to the GOP. According to Jeff Leeds
articles, Clear Channel contributed $106,000 to the RNC during the presidential
election cycle. Mays and his wife, Peggy, donated $37,000 in addition to the
party.
401. Sherry Sylvester, Mayoral candidates vie for funds; Both leaders in the
race have friends among San Antonio's movers and shakers, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss, Mar. 12, 2001, at lB. Lowry Mays threw a fundraising party for
mayor candidate Tim Bannwolf that raised $300,000.
402. See generally http://www.opensecrets.org/softmoney (last visited Nov.
25, 2002). According to opensecrets.org, an organization that discloses
individual and corporate contributions to political candidates, Brian Becker,
Clear Channel executive, on behalf of Clear Channel Worldwide and Clear
Channel Entertainment, contributed $5,000 and $1,000 to Eller Media and
Congressman Ken Bentsen (R-TX) respectively. In addition, executive Miles
Wilkin contributed $200 to Eller Media. Exec John Norman contributed $348
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These statistics illustrate that Clear Channel has transcended the
political arena. Clear Channel executives have not only financially
supported candidates, but the company has taken an active
political role in its attempt to influence the legislature in favor of
its business practices by establishing a political action committee
("PACs")."3 PACs would allow corporations to contribute up to
$5,000 as well as finance fundraising and lobbying initiatives, a
loophole for "soft money" contributions.4"4 Politics may have also
influenced recent Clear Channel programming decisions.
Domination over the airwaves in both television and radio not only
threatens the diversity of content, but also gives unlimited power
to those controlling who gets heard. This proposition raises a
constitutional question of access and free speech. In one instance,
Clear Channel pulled an ad attacking Republicans for "failing to
protect consumers from high gas prices."4 5
Most recently, Clear Channel appointed Andrew W. Levin as
to Eller Media. Although Clear Channel Outdoor exec and Eller Media Vice-
President, Paul Meyer, contributed $1,000 to democrat Senator, Harry Reid (D-
NV), he also contributed $2,000 and $1,000 to Eller Media and the Outdoor
Advertising Association of American. In addition, Karl Eller, exec of Eller
Media, contributed over $65,000 to the Republican National Committee in
2001. In 2002 alone, Clear Channel donated a total of $94,370 in soft money,
including $69,370 to Republicans and $25,000 to Democrats. In 2000, Clear
Channel contributed $82,850, all to Republicans. In 2002, Eller Media
contributed $65,000 in soft money, all to Republicans. Ironically, SFX
Broadcasting and Entertainment, prior to being bought out by Clear Channel,
contributed $124,000 in soft money in 2000, all to Democrats. The company,
on its own, has not contributed any soft money since 2000.
403. Roberts, PAC-ing a Punch, supra note 308. (quoting Founder Mays as
stating, "We have seen the need to have influence and impact on legislative
issues in Washington, as well as at state and local levels. This becomes
important particularly as Clear Channel grows. It is critical to tell our story and
defend our positions").
404. Id.
405. Operator of Stations, supra note 400. The ad, paid for by the
Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee, attacked U.S. Rep. Chip Pickering (R-Miss) of not responding to
the raising gas prices. Five Mississippi stations pulled the ads, and others were
considering not showing the ad "because they are false."
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Senior Vice President-Government Relations to act as its chief
lobbyist.4"6 With Clear Channel's past ties to the Republican
Party, assigning Levin, a Democrat, may come as a surprise. For
the past seven years, Levin served as the chief telecommunications
advisor to Ranking Member John D. Dingell (D-MI) and counsel
to Democratic members of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce.4 7 "Clear Channel is dedicated to working closely with
Washington lawmakers to achieve the best policies both for the
American public and industries in which we operate,"4 8 founder
and CEO Mays stated. "We are thrilled to have Andy on board,
given his in-depth knowledge of our industry and the tremendous
respect that he has accrued with Members of Congress on both
sides of the aisle."4 9 If anything, Clear Channel strategically hired
Levin for his history of effectively winning support from both
Republicans and Democrats." Levin stated, "I don't think there's
been anyone in Washington to present facts that would dispel the
myths about how Clear Channel operates its business. That's what
I'll be doing." '' His presence in Washington will be particularly
important now since the FCC is currently reviewing broadcast
ownership policies.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislators expected the Telecom Act to change radio. But no
one predicted, or even fathomed, that the relaxation of ownership
rules would place democracy in the hands of one company. Clear
Channel exemplifies everything in the radio and concert industries
that has gone wrong since the Telecom Act. A few network of
406. See Clear Channel press releases at www.clearchannel.com (last visited
Nov. 25, 2002); see also Brooks Boliek, Levin lobbies for Clear Channel, THE
HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 14, 2002.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Radio Crow's Radio & TV News Information, at
http://www.radiocrow.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
411. Id.
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owners have promulgated a system of rampant independent
promotion, illegal payola, syndication and voicetracking-taken
together these practices threaten diversity, localism and the free
exchange of ideas essential to democracy. As exemplified in the
recent FMC study, consumers no longer have the patience to listen
to radio when it fashions homogenized and repetitive, short
playlists. Perhaps what consumers most miss are the days of
judging artists by their quality and merit, and not by the size of
their pocketbooks." 2 Despite FCC and DOJ investigations, it
appears there is no end in sight to Clear Channel's takeover of the
radio and concert industries, and more recently television, cable
and broadband industries.4 3 Mark Wahl, Project Director for the
Center for Digital Democracy, states:
This [FMC] report is a wake-up call, for the same FCC policies
responsible for radio's decline into homogenous oligopoly are now
being imposed upon the high-speed Internet. If allowed to
proceed, this radical deregulatory agenda will result in the Clear
Channelization of broadband, threatening online openness and
competition, reducing diversity of expression and inhibiting
democracy.414
Although one could embrace Clear Channel's entrepreneurial
vigor, it is time for the FCC, DOJ and the legislature to enact
412. Boehlert, Save us from ourselves!, supra note 128.
413. Alex Jones, The Costs of Consolidation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at
A27. Recent court decisions have further relaxed limits on television and cable-
system ownership. Relaxation will encourage a frenzy of acquisitions merging
local newspapers, television stations and radio stations. In 1999, FCC allowed
networks to own two stations in the same city. Although consumers still have
access to the news through the interet, cable programming and alternative local
newspapers, a further concentration in media power has insiders speculating a
foreclosure in competition. Less diversity in programming and stifled voices
threaten overall quality programming. "Too much media concentration in any
town is inherently unhealthy, like relying on a single dominant industry or
investing heavily in only one stock. Excessive dependence on a single source of
news can put at risk the free exchange of ideas essential to democracy." With
the imminent future of further deregulation, Clear Channel could dominate
television, radio and newspapers.
414. FMC Study, supra note 391.
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restraints in order for competition and a diversity of voices to
foster.
Senator Feingold's Competition in Radio and Concert Industries
Act of 2002 is one such way to restore integrity, competition and
diversity in the radio and concert industries. The Telecom Act does
not sufficiently function within the confines of antitrust legislation,
and an imminent, further lax in ownership rules would completely
undermine both the Clayton and Sherman Acts. The Competition
Act would reconcile both the Telecom Act and antitrust
legislation. Although the Competition Act is somewhat
ambiguous and broad, potentially making it difficult to apply, it
provides a comprehensive framework that balances the interests of
big business and consumers.
In an attempt to bring integrity back to the radio, the Act
reaffirms the public policy goals of the Communications Act of
1934--diversity and localism. This legislation is desperately
needed to combat the current evils plaguing the radio and concert
industries. However, considering the FCC's history and pro-
deregulatory outlook, in addition to Clear Channel's ties to the
Republican party, this legislation will have a tough time passing.
Yet Feingold asserts that "If we can't get it this year, I'll be
working on this for years to come."4 5 Until then, consumers will
be the guinea pigs in a Clear Channel utopia-where one channel,
one voice and one company determines what we hear, what we see
and how we think. Is there an end in sight?
Sarah Greene
415. Holland, Feingold Introduces Competition Bill, supra note 3.
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